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This paper is the first to study the distinct effects of Information Technologies (IT) and
Communication Technologies (CT) on the skill, age, and age-skill composition of labour demand.
The analysis is conducted on a sample comprising 10 developed countries, 30 industries covering
the largest part of the economy, and the period 1982-2005. I find that IT intensity increases the
relative demands for the high-skilled, low-skilled and oldest workers, while it decreases the relative
demands for the medium-skilled and younger workers. Also, IT intensity increases the relative
demands for the high-skilled and low-skilled of all age profiles, while it decreases the relative
demands for the medium-skilled of all age profiles. CT intensity exerts opposite effects. Consistent
with knowledge-based hierarchy theories highlighting the organisational aspect of the adoption of IT
and CT by firms, the empowerment of agents at lower and higher levels of the hierarchy induced by
IT and CT, respectively, rationalise these findings. I also find that the aforementioned effects
operate mostly as of 1990, when the advancement rates of IT and CT were even higher than in the
1980s. Although a clear pattern of disproportionate effects across sectors is not identified, such a
pattern across countries does exist: the inequalities generated by the two types of technologies are
mitigated by higher union density.
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1 Introduction
The development and expansion of Information and Communication Technologies (henceforth,
ICT) have taken place at an unprecedented rate for the last forty years. The implications
of ICT for labour have received particular attention by researchers generating three main
streams of the literature. The first stream finds that ICT have increased the relative demand
for more skilled workers, thereby leading to skill upgrading.1 The second stream makes a task-
based approach and finds that ICT have decreased the relative wages and relative employment
of workers in occupations intensive in routine tasks that happen to be at the middle of the
skill distribution, thereby leading to “job polarisation”.2 A third stream of the literature
distinguishes between labour types by age and finds that ICT have decreased the relative
demand for older workers.3
Although the extant literature has improved remarkably our understanding of ICT and
labour outcomes, to the best of my knowledge, there is hardly any study that examines the
individual effects of Information Technologies (IT) and Communication Technologies (CT)
on labour. In this paper, I make a first attempt in this direction by studying the individual
effects of IT and CT on the skill, age, and age-skill composition of labour demand. This
type of analysis is essential if we consider the organisational aspect of the adoption of ICT
by firms. Unlike the extant literature, knowledge-based hierarchy theories, most notably the
one developed by Bloom et al. (2014), take the organisational aspect into consideration and
argue that a distinction should be made between IT and CT, as the first type of technologies
lead to the empowerment of agents at lower levels of the hierarchy, while CT lead to the
empowerment of agents at higher levels of the hierarchy.
For instance, as stressed by Bloom et al. (2014), two types of IT that have become increas-
ingly available to production workers, the Computer Assisted Design (CAD) and Computer
1Based on these findings, the term “Skill-biased technological change – SBTC” has been coined (Berman et
al., 1994). More recent studies find that ICT polarise the demand for skill, that is, they are biased against the
medium-skilled and in favour of the high-skilled and low-skilled (Michaels et al., 2014; Blanas et al., 2018).
2For such empirical evidence, see among others: D. H. Autor & Dorn (2013) and Goos et al. (2014). The
rationale behind these findings based on the task-based approach of D. Autor et al. (2003) is that ICT substitute
for routine-intensive occupations that are at the middle of the skill distribution, while they complement non-
routine-intensive occupations that are at the two tails of the skill distribution. Also, Blanas et al. (2018) find
heterogeneous effects of ICT on the skill, age, and gender compositions of labour demand across industries
with different shares of routine-intensive tasks.
3Based on these findings, the term “Age-biased technological change – ABTC” has been coined (Aubert et
al., 2006; Behaghel et al., 2014). In a recent study, Blanas et al. (2018) find that ICT are biased against the
middle-aged and in favour of the youngest and oldest workers, although the positive bias towards the youngest
does not hold for certain sub-periods examined.
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Assisted Manufacturing (CAM) systems, have facilitated the access to information related to
product design and product manufacturing, respectively, that is essential for these workers in
order to solve problems on their own and rely less on plant managers. Similarly, the increasing
use of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, another type of IT, by middle managers
has increased remarkably the pool of available information to them on various aspects of
the production and distribution process allowing them to make decisions more independently
and rely less on top managers at the headquarters.4 In addition, the introduction of corpo-
rate intranet, a type of CT, connecting a company’s plants to the headquarters, allows for
a more swift and efficient decision-making process at the headquarter and plant levels. In
particular, it becomes less costly for top managers to leverage their knowledge by providing
effective solutions to relatively complex problems dealt with at the plants by middle man-
agers and production workers. At the same time, top managers can monitor plants more
easily and subsequently, increase their span of control, that is, the number of middle man-
agers and production workers under their supervision. Similarly, the utilisation of intranet
facilitates communication between middle managers and production workers within a plant,
allowing middle managers to leverage their knowledge and to increase their span of control.
Cell phones, emails, leased-lines and relay frames are other types of communication technolo-
gies that facilitate communication across hierarchical layers and are used extensively in the
manufacturing sector, in retail and wholesale industries, in retail banking and other service
industries, and to a lesser extent in other sectors such as agriculture and mining.5
I conduct the empirical analysis on a sample of 10 developed countries, 30 industries that
cover the largest part of the economy, and a period that spans over 1982 and 2005. My
main data source is EU KLEMS that has three distinct features relevant to my analysis.
First, its data are comparable across countries, industries, and years. Second, it provides
information on variables for workers classified in three skill and three age groups. A worker’s
skill is captured by her level of education. Third, it provides information on variables for
different types of capital, including non-ICT, IT and CT capital. The econometric model
is derived from the cost minimisation problem of the representative firm. It is a system of
wage bill share equations for different worker types with IT and CT intensities, calculated as
4ERP is a unified system of databases of an organisation including metrics on production and distribution
like output, waste, deliveries, machine failures, orders and stocks, as well as human resource and financial
metrics (Bloom et al., 2014).
5A leased-line is a symmetric telecommunications line connecting two locations and can be used for tele-
phone, data or Internet services. Relay frame is a technology for the transmission of digital information, such
as data and voice, predominantly via local networks (Bloom et al., 2014).
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the ratios of real IT and CT capital stocks to real gross value added, as the key regressors.
I estimate the system of equations by Iterated Three-Stage Least Squares (I3SLS) while
treating all explanatory variables as endogenous. Each explanatory variable is instrumented
with its first and second lags. I also implement an alternative instrumentation strategy for
the non-ICT, IT and CT intensities which relies on the concept that their levels in a year
preceding the start year of the sample along with the evolution of telephone line installations
and military expenditures of a country over the sample period could be strong predictors
of the evolution of industry-level non-ICT, IT and CT intensities over the period examined.
Based on this concept, I instrument each of the three variables by interacting its values in
1980 with country-level variables for the number of telephone lines per capita and the share
of military expenditures in GDP. Data on the two country-level variables are drawn from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
When I study the effects of IT and CT on the skill composition and age composition of
labour demand, I find that IT intensity increases the relative demands for the high-skilled, low-
skilled and oldest workers, while it decreases the relative demands for the medium-skilled and
younger workers. CT intensity exerts opposite effects. In particular, it decreases the relative
demands for the low-skilled and the oldest workers, and increases the relative demands for
the medium-skilled and the youngest. I identify very similar effects of IT and CT on the
skill composition of labour demand within each age group and on the age composition of
labour demand within each skill group. Studying the effects of IT and CT on the age-skill
composition of labour demand, I find that IT intensity increases the relative demands for
the high-skilled and low-skilled of all age profiles, while it decreases the relative demands
for the medium-skilled of all age profiles. CT intensity exerts mostly opposite effects. In
particular, it decreases the relative demands for older low-skilled workers and increases the
relative demands for the younger more skilled. Interestingly I show that the aforementioned
effects are in operation mostly from 1990 onwards, when IT and CT advancements took place
at an even higher rate compared to the 1980s. Although a clear pattern of disproportionate
effects across sectors is not identified, such a pattern across countries does exist: the wage bill
share differences that are generated by IT and CT intensities among worker types are smaller
in countries where union density is higher. This result empirically validates the crucial role
of collective bargaining –and more broadly, of labour market institutions– in the mitigation
of inequalities among different worker types.
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My analysis shows that in addition to the identification of distinct effects of each of the
two types of technologies on the wage bill shares of workers differing in age and skill, IT and
CT exert opposite effects on each worker type. These findings can hardly be rationalised
by the traditional task-based approach that overlooks organisational issues associated with
the adoption of ICT by firms. Instead, they are consistent with knowledge-based hierarchy
theories and as such, they improve our understanding of how IT and CT lead to inequalities
among workers differing in age and skill. In short, the knowledge-based hierarchy approach
is a distinct specification of the task-based approach as tasks are linked to an explicit or-
ganisational problem and are ordered hierarchically. That is, the firm is conceptualised as a
knowledge-based hierarchy where the more knowledgeable an agent is, the higher her position
in the hierarchy and the greater the complexity of her tasks. When the representative firm
adopts IT (e.g. CAD/CAM, ERP), the cost of access to information and knowledge acqui-
sition is reduced and thus, agents at lower levels of the hierarchy (e.g. production workers
and middle managers) become less dependent on those at higher levels of the hierarchy (e.g.
middle and top managers). Similarly, when the representative firm adopts CT (e.g. intranet),
the cost of communication across hierarchical layers is reduced and thus, agents at lower levels
of the hierarchy (e.g. production workers and middle managers) become more dependent on
those at higher levels of the hierarchy (e.g. middle and top managers) who can leverage their
knowledge and increase their span of control.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I provide the theoretical
underpinnings of the effects of IT and CT on the skill, age, and age-skill composition of labour
demand by relying on knowledge-based hierarchy theories. In Section 3, I describe the data
and provide descriptive statistics which motivate the subsequent econometric analysis. In
Section 4, I derive the econometric model and describe the estimation strategy. In Sections
5 and 6, I present the main results and the robustness checks, respectively. In Section 7, I
conclude and provide some suggestions for further research.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, I first describe the main elements of knowledge-based hierarchy theories de-
veloped by Garicano (2000) and Bloom et al. (2014). Using these elements, I then discuss
theoretically the individual effects of IT and CT on the skill, age, and age-skill composition
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of labour demand.
2.1 The representative firm as a knowledge-based hierarchy
Same as the task-based approach, the production process of the representative firm is con-
ceptualised in terms of tasks.6 Unlike this approach, however, tasks are linked to an explicit
organisational problem and ordered hierarchically. In this regard, the knowledge-based hier-
archy approach is a distinct specification of the task-based approach.
The main pillars of knowledge-based hierarchy theories are the following three. First,
production requires time and knowledge (assumption 1). This implies that there is a unit
measure of problems per unit of time. As some problems may occur more often than others,
these are distributed according to a density function f(z). Second, knowledge acquisition is
costly (assumption 2), implying that agent i can acquire knowledge only after incurring the
relevant cost, ki. This cost is dependent on the available technologies and the human capital
of agent i. Third, knowledge can be communicated (assumption 3). That is, knowledge
flows across hierarchical layers within the firm according to the “management by exception”
principle: the more knowledgeable an agent is, the higher her position in the hierarchy and
the greater the complexity of the problems she deals with. In other words, agents at lower
hierarchical layers deal with relatively common problems, while agents at higher hierarchical
layers deal with exceptional problems.7 Each time agents at a lower hierarchical layer do not
know the solution to a problem, they seek for help from agents at higher hierarchical layers
who then communicate the solution to them. This two-way communication can take place
only after each party incurs a communication cost, h.
Following Bloom et al. (2014), I consider a knowledge-based hierarchy with three layers.
Top managers occupy the top layer of the hierarchy, middle managers occupy the intermediate
layer, while production workers occupy the bottom layer. The hierarchy involves production
and non-production decisions. Non-production decisions are made by top and middle man-
agers, while production decisions are made by production workers and middle managers.
Hence, under this setting, middle managers are at the bottom of the non-production hierar-
chy and at the top of the production hierarchy. For consistency between theory and empirics,
6Throughout this section, the terms “tasks”, “problems” and “decisions” are used interchangeably.
7In relation to the traditional task-based approach (D. Autor et al., 2003), it is essential to emphasise that
a relatively common problem is not necessarily a routine problem that can be easily dealt with by automation.
In fact, some relatively common problems can be non-routine. Subsequently, the degree of complexity of a
problem should not be viewed as a measure of its routine intensity.
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top managers are proxied by agents with high level of education (high-skilled – HS), middle
managers are proxied by agents with intermediate level of education (medium-skilled – MS),
and production workers are proxied by agents with low level of education (low-skilled – LS).8
Starting with the description of the production hierarchy, I consider a unit measure of
tasks per unit of time, z ∈ [0, 1], as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Unit measure of production tasks per unit of time in a knowledge-based hierarchy
determined by workers’ education
0
|
zLStasks of LS tasks of MS 1
The threshold zLS distinguishes between the tasks that are performed by production work-
ers (LS) and the tasks that are performed by middle managers (MS). In particular, tasks z
that are below this threshold, z ≤ zLS , are performed by production workers, while tasks z
that are above the threshold, z > zLS , are performed by middle managers. The values of z
within the range [0, zLS ] capture the degree of autonomy of production workers relative to
middle managers. That is, the closer the tasks z of production workers are to the threshold,
the higher is their level of autonomy.
As knowledge acquisition is costly, production workers and middle managers acquire
knowledge by incurring the respective costs, kLS and kMS . Production workers perform a
fraction F (zLS) of tasks, while middle managers perform a fraction h ∗ (1−F (zMS)) of tasks,
where h is the communication cost. The middle managers’ span of control is calculated as the
ratio of the number of production workers to the number of middle managers: SMS =
NLS
NMS
,
where Ni: number of i ∈ {MS,LS}. In other words, this ratio captures the number of pro-
duction workers that are monitored by middle managers and is thus a measure of the size of
the production hierarchy.
The description of the function of the non-production hierarchy is very similar. I consider
a unit measure of tasks per unit of time, x ∈ [0, 1], as shown in Figure 2.
In this case, the threshold xMS distinguishes between the tasks that are performed by
middle managers (MS) and the tasks that are performed by top managers (HS). In particular,
8My approach also serves for the tractability of the theoretical analysis, and by no means precludes cases
where agents with relatively low education but high seniority occupy higher hierarchical layers than less senior
agents with relatively high education.
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tasks x that are below this threshold, x ≤ xMS , are performed by middle managers, while
tasks x that are above the threshold, x > xMS , are performed by top managers. The values
of x within the range [0, xMS ] capture the degree of autonomy of middle managers relative to
top managers. That is, the closer the tasks x of middle managers are to the threshold, the
higher is their level of autonomy.
Figure 2: Unit measure of non-production tasks per unit of time in a knowledge-based hier-
archy determined by workers’ education
0
|
xMStasks of MS tasks of HS 1
In order for middle and top managers to acquire knowledge, they incur the costs kMS and
kHS , respectively. Middle managers perform a fraction G(xMS) of tasks, while top managers
perform a fraction h ∗ (1−G(xHS)) of tasks. The top managers’ span of control is calculated
as the ratio of the number of middle managers to the number of top managers: SHS =
NMS
NHS
,
where Ni: number of i ∈ {HS,MS}. This ratio is a measure of the size of the non-production
hierarchy as it captures the number of middle managers that are monitored by top managers.
The education level of a worker, especially of a worker of prime or older age, captures only
part of her human capital. Other aspects of it such as work experience and tenure, on-the-job
training, firm-specific know-how and expertise are also essential and can rather be captured
by the age profile of a worker. In other words, the age profile can proxy for a worker’s dynamic
acquisition of human capital in her post-education period. Figure 3 shows the production and
non-production hierarchies when combinations of education and age profiles are considered.
As older workers have an advantage over younger workers in human capital accumulation
(OECD, 2011), they are more autonomous and can perform a wider range of tasks at each
hierarchical layer. I, thus, plausibly assume that the three age groups observed in the data,
comprising the oldest (aged 50+), the middle-aged (aged 30–49) and the youngest (aged 15–29)
agents, have a high, intermediate and low level of autonomy, respectively. Similar to Figures 1
and 2, the threshold z50+,LS distinguishes between the production tasks that are performed by
production workers and middle managers, while the threshold x50+,MS distinguishes between
the non-production tasks that are performed by middle managers and top managers. The
additional thresholds define the different range of tasks performed by workers of different
age profile at each hierarchical layer. The function of the hierarchy is very similar to that
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described in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 3: Unit measure of production and non-production tasks per unit of time in a
knowledge-based hierarchy determined by workers’ education and age profiles
0
|
z15−29,LS
|
z30−49,LS
|
z50+,LS
|
z15−29,MS
|
z30−49,MS 1
production decisions
0
|
x15−29,MS
|
x30−49,MS
|
x50+,MS
|
x15−29,HS
|
x30−49,HS 1
non-production decisions
2.2 The distinct effects of IT and CT on the skill, age, and age-skill com-
position of labour demand
Having described the main elements and function of the three-layer knowledge-based hierarchy,
I study theoretically the effects of the adoption of IT and CT by the representative firm on
the skill, age-skill, and age composition of labour demand, as captured by the wage bill shares
of the respective groups of workers.
Effects of IT and CT on the skill composition of labour demand
The adoption of IT facilitates access to information by agents, thereby reducing the cost
that they have to incur in order to acquire knowledge (k). A lower knowledge acquisition
cost shifts the upper bound of tasks z that a production worker can perform and the upper
bound of tasks x that a middle manager can perform closer to the thresholds, zLS and xMS ,
respectively. These shifts imply that production workers and middle managers become more
autonomous. That is, they can perform a wider range of tasks without asking for help from
their superiors. In turn, superiors can increase their span of control (S ) as the amount
of questions addressed to them by their subordinates decreases. For instance, Bloom et
al. (2014) argue that the increasing availability of Computer Assisted Design (CAD) and
Computer Assisted Manufacturing (CAM) systems to production workers has facilitated the
access to information related to product design and product manufacturing, respectively, that
is essential for them in order to solve problems on their own and rely less on plant managers.
Plant managers can, in turn, increase their span of control, that is, supervise a larger number
of production workers. Similarly, the increasing use of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
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systems by middle managers has increased remarkably the pool of available information to
them on various aspects of the production and distribution process allowing them to make
decisions more independently and rely less on top managers. Top managers can, in turn,
increase their span of control, that is, supervise a larger number of middle managers.
The effect of IT on the wage bill share of production workers is expected to be positive as
the increase in their level of autonomy will increase their relative wage, while their relative
employment can also increase due to the possible increase in middle managers’ span of control.
The effect of IT on the wage bill share of middle managers is ambiguous. On the one hand,
their relative wage may increase because they become less dependent on top managers, whose
knowledge and expertise becomes less valuable. Their relative employment may also increase
as top managers may increase their span of control within the non-production hierarchy
(positive effect). On the other hand, middle managers’ relative wage may decrease because
production workers become less dependent on them or their relative employment may decrease
because of a possible increase in their span of control within the production hierarchy (negative
effect). The effect of IT on the wage bill share of top managers is also ambiguous. On the
one hand, their relative wage may decrease because middle managers and production workers
become less dependent on them or their relative employment may decrease because of a
possible increase in their span of control within the non-production and production hierarchies
(negative effect). On the other hand, their wage bill share may increase because of greater
losses incurred by middle managers, resulting from the lower dependence of production workers
on them and the possible increase in middle managers’ span of control (positive effect).
The adoption of CT reduces the cost of communication (h) between agents at different
hierarchical layers. This allows agents at higher hierarchical layers to leverage their knowl-
edge and, possibly, to increase their span of control (S ). Subsequently, the upper bound of
tasks z that a production worker performs and the upper bound of tasks x that a middle
manager performs shift away from the thresholds, zLS and xMS , respectively. These shifts
imply that production workers and middle managers become less autonomous. That is, they
perform a narrower range of tasks and rely on their superiors for the more complex tasks. For
instance, according to Bloom et al. (2014), the introduction of corporate intranet connect-
ing a company’s plants to the headquarters makes less costly for top managers to leverage
their knowledge by providing effective solutions to relatively complex problems dealt with at
the plants by middle managers and production workers. At the same time, top managers
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can monitor plants more easily and subsequently, increase their span of control, that is, the
number of middle managers and production workers under their supervision. Similarly, the
utilisation of intranet facilitates communication between middle managers and production
workers within a plant, allowing middle managers to leverage their knowledge and to increase
their span of control. Overall, the decision-making process becomes more swift and efficient
at the headquarter and plant levels as a result of the introduction of corporate intranet.
The effect of CT on the wage bill share of top managers is ambiguous. On the one hand,
their relative wage may increase as they can leverage their knowledge by providing more
help to their subordinates (positive effect). On the other hand, their relative employment
may decrease because of an increase in their span of control, that is, the number of middle
managers and production workers that they monitor (negative effect). The effect of CT on
the wage bill share of production workers is also ambiguous. While their relative wage may
decrease because they become more dependent on middle managers (negative effect), their
relative employment may increase because of an increase in middle managers’ span of control
(positive effect). Same as in the previous two cases, the effect of CT on the wage bill share of
middle managers is ambiguous. Within the production hierarchy, the relative wage of middle
managers may increase because they can leverage their knowledge by providing more help to
production workers (positive effect). However, the relative employment of middle managers
may decrease because of an increase in their span of control, that is, the number of production
workers that they monitor (negative effect). Within the non-production hierarchy, the relative
wage of middle managers may decrease as they become more dependent on top managers who,
in turn, leverage their knowledge (negative effect), but their relative employment may increase
because of an increase in top managers’ span of control (positive effect).
Effects of IT and CT on the age-skill composition of labour demand
Extending the analysis by considering the combinations of age and skill profiles of agents,
I conclude that the effects of IT and CT on the wage bill shares of workers differing in age and
skill are theoretically indeterminate. As IT lower the cost of knowledge acquisition incurred
by agents, the relative wage or relative employment of agents occupying a certain hierarchical
layer may, on the one hand, increase as they become less dependent on their superiors (positive
effect), but on the other hand, their relative wage or relative employment may decrease as
their subordinates become less dependent on them (negative effect).
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Similarly, as CT lower the cost of communication across hierarchical layers, the relative
wage of agents at a certain hierarchical layer may increase because they can leverage their
knowledge as a result of the greater dependence of subordinate workers on them (positive
effect), while their relative employment may decrease because of an increase in their span of
control of subordinates (negative effect). In addition, while the relative wage of the agents
may decrease because they become more dependent on their superiors who can leverage their
knowledge (negative effect), their relative employment may increase because of an increase in
their superiors’ span of control (positive effect).
Effects of IT and CT on the age composition of labour demand
As stressed in Section 2.1, older workers have an advantage over younger workers in the
level of human capital (OECD, 2011) which is translated into a greater level of autonomy.
Although the adoption of IT by the representative firm increases the autonomy of both
younger and older workers, the latter are expected to benefit disproportionately as they are
more knowledgeable and autonomous. For instance, the introduction of CAD/CAM or ERP
systems into the firm will most likely allow older workers to solve their existing problems more
efficiently than younger workers or to increase by more the range of problems they deal with.
Hence, the relative wage and possibly the relative employment of older workers (aged 50+
and possibly 30–49) are expected to increase, thereby leading to an increase in their wage bill
shares. Similarly, the adoption of CT by the representative firm decreases the autonomy of
both younger and older workers, but the latter are expected to incur disproportionate losses
because of their greater levels of knowledge and autonomy. For instance, the installation
of intranet in the firm will most likely make the knowledge advantage of older workers less
important or narrow the range of their tasks by more compared to younger workers, thereby
reducing their relative wage and possibly their relative employment. As a consequence, the
wage bill shares of older workers (aged 50+ and possibly 30–49) will decrease to the benefit
of younger workers (aged 15–29 and possibly 30–49).
3 Data and descriptive statistics
In this section, I first describe the data and the construction of variables that I use in the
main empirical analysis. Then, I present useful patterns and trends of IT and CT, and of
11
wage bill shares by skill, age, and age-skill.
3.1 Data and variables
I conduct the empirical analysis on a sample that comprises 10 countries, 30 industries and
24 years spanning from 1982 to 2005. The 10 countries are shown in Panel A of Table A1. All
of them are among the most developed countries in the world. The 30 industries examined
cover the largest part of the economy and are shown in Panel B of the same table. They
are aggregated at the two-digit level and their codes correspond to the NACE Rev. 1.1.
The formation of the sample is based on the availability of data for key labour and capital
variables.
All information on labour, capital and other production-related variables is retrieved from
EU KLEMS. This data source has three main distinct features that render it suitable for the
scope of my analysis. The first distinct feature is that its data are comparable across countries,
industries and years. Second, it provides information on the wage bill shares of workers
with different skill and age profiles, as well as on the total wage bill and total employment.
Employment is captured by the hours worked by persons engaged.9 Workers are classified
in three age groups, young (aged 15–29), middle-aged (aged 30–49), and elder (aged 50+),
and three skill groups, high-skilled (HS), medium-skilled (MS), and low-skilled (LS) based on
their level of education. By and large, a high-skilled worker has at least a Bachelor’s degree,
a medium-skilled worker has upper-secondary education or vocational training, and a low-
skilled worker has lower-secondary education or no formal qualification. The third distinct
feature of EU KLEMS is that it provides information on different types of capital, including
the real fixed stocks of non-ICT, IT and CT capital. According to EU KLEMS, IT comprises
computing equipment, while CT comprises communication equipment. The normalisation
of the three capital variables by real gross value added yields non-ICT, IT and CT capital
intensities. Alternatively, I normalise the capital variables by real gross output, the total
hours worked by persons engaged, or the total hours worked by employees. Information on
these three variables is retrieved from EU KLEMS as well.
All real variables are in 1995 prices. As monetary variables are in national currencies, I
convert these in US dollars (USD) using real exchange rate data from the OECD.
9This is preferred to the number of persons engaged as workers may differ in the amount of hours that they
work (Graetz & Michaels, 2018).
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3.2 Descriptive statistics
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the adoption of IT (left panel) and CT (right panel) over
1982–2005 for the whole sample. IT stands for IT intensity and is calculated as the ratio of
real IT capital stock to real gross value added. Similarly, CT stands for CT intensity and
is calculated as the ratio of real CT capital stock to real gross value added. As IT and CT
intensities vary by country, industry and year, for the production of the statistics shown in
the figure, I first average the ratios across industries within each country using as weights
each industry’s employment share in country-wide employment in 1982. I then average across
countries by year using equal weights for each country.
Figure 4: IT and CT intensities
Notes: IT: ratio of real IT capital stock to real gross value-added; CT: ratio of real CT capital stock to real gross
value-added. I first average the ratios across industries within each country using as weights each industry’s employment
share in country-wide employment in 1982. I then average across countries by year using equal weights for each country.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU KLEMS.
The two panels document the remarkably increasing trends in the adoption of IT and CT
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over the period examined. The average IT intensity increased from 0.002 in 1982 to 0.155 in
2005, while the average CT intensity increased from 0.024 in 1982 to 0.053 in 2005 (see also
bottom of Panel A of Table A2). As a result of these trends, the pattern between 1982 and
2005 changed: while IT intensity was lower than CT intensity in 1982, this was reversed in
2005. The reversal in the pattern is also observed by country and by industry (Table A2).10
Indeed, IT intensity grew faster than CT intensity over the period examined, as revealed by
both the graph and the average percentage changes11 shown in Table A2. Although the slope
of the CT line is steeper in the pre-1995 period –except for some years before 1995 when
the CT line slightly flattens–, the slope of the IT line becomes much steeper as of 1995.12
The significant advancements in the processing and storage capacity of personal computers
(PCs) that took place in the 1990s along with the launch of much more user-friendly operating
systems on which PCs ran as compared to the 1980s (e.g. MS-DOS Vs Microsoft Windows 95
and subsequent versions) may be among the key drivers of such a steep increase in IT intensity
in the post-1995 period. Similarly, the commercialisation of the internet in 1994–1995 upon
which modern networks have been developed since then, can partly explain the continuing
increase in CT intensity post-1995.
Having described the patterns and trends of IT and CT, I now focus on the patterns and
trends of wage bill shares of different worker types. Figure 5 shows the evolution of wage bill
shares of workers differing in skill (left panel) and in age (right panel). Same as for IT and
CT intensities, for the production of the statistics shown in the figure, I first average the wage
bill shares across industries within each country using as weights each industry’s employment
share in country-wide employment in 1982. I then average across countries by year using equal
weights for each country. According to the two panels, the medium-skilled and middle-aged
workers account for the largest shares in the total wage bill, followed by the high-skilled and
the oldest workers, respectively. In terms of trends, high-skilled workers experienced a steady
increase in their share in the total wage bill (0.137 in 1982 to 0.244 in 2005). Despite a small
decrease in their wage bill share before 1986, the oldest workers increased their share in the
10For the production of the statistics by industry, I average the ratios across countries within each industry
using equal weights for each country.
11I first calculate the percentages of the ratios by country-industry pair. Then, I average the percentage
changes across industries within each country using as weights each industry’s employment share in country-
wide employment in 1982 (Panel A), or I average the ratios across countries within each industry using equal
weights for each country (Panel B).
12In figures and tables that are available upon request, I derive the same patterns and trends for IT and CT
intensities when I normalise the real gross fixed IT and CT capital stocks with real gross output, the hours
worked by persons engaged, or the hours worked by employees.
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total wage bill in the rest of the period (from 0.196 in 1982 to 0.249 in 2005). The medium-
skilled and middle-aged workers increased as well their wage bill shares between 1982 and
2005, although the trend for the middle-aged was mostly decreasing after 1996 (from 0.527 in
1982 to 0.594 in 2005, and from 0.521 in 1982 to 0.566 in 2005, respectively). By contrast, the
low-skilled and the youngest workers experienced steady decreases in their wage bill shares
(from 0.337 in 1982 to 0.162 in 2005, and from 0.282 in 1982 to 0.185 in 2005, respectively).
The aforementioned statistics are shown in Panel A of Tables A3 and A4. The same tables
also display the levels and percentage changes of wage bill shares averaged by country (Panel
A) and by industry (Panel B).13 As shown in the two tables, the aforementioned patterns and
trends of wage bill shares are also observed for the vast majority of countries and industries.
The evolution of the wage bill shares of the nine age-skill groups of workers is shown in
Table 1. The statistics are produced in the same way as those for the wage bill shares of
different skill or age groups. According to this table, the medium-skilled workers of all three
age profiles accounted for the largest shares in the total wage bill in 1982, followed by the
low-skilled workers of all three age profiles. In 2005, this pattern changes in an important way
as the highest shares in the total wage bill are held by the medium-skilled and the high-skilled
workers of all age profiles. As shown at the bottom row of the table, this change in the pattern
between 1982 and 2005 is explained by the relatively high positive growth rates of the wage
bill shares of high-skilled workers of all age profiles, the relatively moderate positive growth
rates of the wage bill shares of older medium-skilled workers and the relatively high negative
growth rates of the wage bill shares of low-skilled workers of all age profiles. These patterns
and trends are also observed by country and by industry (Tables A5 to A7).
In summary, low-skilled workers, the youngest workers, and the less skilled workers of all
generations experience declines in their wage bill shares over 1982–2005. By contrast, the high-
skilled and medium-skilled workers, the oldest and middle-aged, as well as the more skilled
of all three generations experience increases in their wage bill shares over the same period.
As the trends of wage bill shares of different worker types coincide with the remarkably
increasing trends of IT and CT intensities, my goal in the next sections is to identify their
13In order to calculate the average levels by industry, I average the wage bill shares across countries within
each industry using equal weights for each country. For the calculation of the average percentage changes by
country, I first calculate the percentages of the wage bill shares by country-industry pair. Then, I average the
percentage changes across industries within each country using as weights each industry’s employment share in
country-wide employment in 1982. For the calculation of the percentage changes by industry, I first calculate
the percentages of the wage bill shares by country-industry pair. Then, I average the percentage changes across
countries within each industry using equal weights for each country.
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causal relationships.
Figure 5: Wage bill shares by skill and by age
Notes: HS: high-skilled; MS: medium-skilled; LS: low-skilled. I first average the wage bill shares across industries within
each country using as weights each industry’s employment share in country-wide employment in 1982. I then average
across countries by year using equal weights for each country.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU KLEMS.
Table 1: Wage bill shares by age-skill
(15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
Mean level 1982 0.030 0.172 0.081 0.081 0.277 0.164 0.026 0.078 0.092
Mean level 2005 0.033 0.121 0.031 0.149 0.343 0.073 0.062 0.130 0.058
Mean % change
246.34 -17.56 -67.15 233.12 76.50 -60.50 200.34 114.18 -43.75
1982–2005
Notes: HS: high-skilled; MS: medium-skilled; LS: low-skilled. I first average the wage bill shares across industries within each country using as weights each industry’s employment
share in country-wide employment in 1982. I then average across countries by year using equal weights for each country.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU KLEMS.
16
4 Econometric model and estimation strategy
In this section, I derive the econometric model and describe the strategy that I implement for
its estimation.
4.1 Econometric model
Assuming a perfectly inelastic labour supply, the representative firm makes optimal labour
utilisation adjustments for given wages while adopting IT and CT. Hence, the two types of
technologies act as labour demand shifters that increase or decrease the relative demand for
different types of workers.
In addition to IT and CT, the representative firm utilises non-ICT capital. Treating all
three types of capital as quasi-fixed factors (Berman et al., 1994), the cost function of the
representative firm is of the short-run form:
CSR(W,Y,K, IT
′, CT ′) = min(W · E′) s.t.Y = f(E,K, IT ′, CT ′) (1)
CSR is the short-run cost of the firm which includes the total wage bill. W and E are
vectors of hourly wages and total hours of work, respectively, of workers who differ in skill,
age, or both. Y stands for output, while K, IT and CT stand for non-ICT, IT and CT
capital, respectively.
Considering the cost function to be of translog representation14 and differentiating with
respect to wages, I obtain the following system of wage bill share equations:
Wsha,scit =αct + αci + β
a,s
Y · lnYcit + βa,sK ·Kcit + βa,sIT · ITcit + βa,sCT · CTcit + a,scit ,
∀a ∈ A = {15− 29, 30− 49, 50+} , s ∈ {HS,MS,LS}
(2)
The dependent variable, Wsha,scit , is the wage bill share of workers of age a and skill
s in country c, industry i, and year t. Country-year fixed effects, αct, capture time-varying
country characteristics, such as changes in the aggregate supply of production factors, in trade
14See among others: Berman et al. (1994), Feenstra & Hanson (1996), Hijzen et al. (2005), and Crino` (2012).
The translog form is preferred to other functional forms such as the CES, Cobb-Douglas and Leontief, as it
imposes no a priori restrictions on substitutability between inputs.
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openness, in labour market institutions (e.g. strictness of employment protection legislation,
collective bargaining, minimum wage policy), as well as in relative wages, assuming that
the wage-setting process takes place at the national level (Michaels et al., 2014; Graetz &
Michaels, 2018; Blanas et al., 2018).15 Country-industry fixed effects, αci, capture time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity across country-industry pairs such as the initial level of
technological sophistication and initial factor endowments.16
The additional control, Ycit, is the real value added and accounts for industry size. This
variable enters the model in logs. Kcit is the ratio of real fixed non-ICT capital stock to real
gross value added. The two key regressors of the model are ITcit and CTcit and are calculated
as the ratios of real fixed stocks of IT and CT capital to real gross value added. The coefficient
estimates, βa,s,IT and βa,s,CT , capture the individual effects of IT and CT, respectively, on
the wage bill shares of workers differing in age and skill. Capital variables do not enter the
model in logs as the values of IT and CT for some country-industry pairs in early years of
the sample are close to zero and thus, their logged values are negative and extremely large
(Michaels et al., 2014; Graetz & Michaels, 2018). The error term, a,scit , includes unobserved
factors that affect wage bill shares.
The parameters of the equations of system (2) are subject to the following constraints
stemming from linear price homogeneity and symmetry:
∑
a,s
βa,sY =
∑
a,s
βa,sK =
∑
a,s
βa,sIT =
∑
a,s
βa,sCT = 0. (3)
4.2 Estimation strategy
The identical right-hand side of the system of equations and the cross-equation constraints in
(3) imply that the error terms are likely to be correlated (Berndt, 1991). In such a case, the
simultaneous estimation of the equations in (2) produces more efficient coefficient estimates
as compared to those produced by the estimation of each equation separately. Under the
assumption of exogenous explanatory variables, the simultaneous estimation is implemented
with the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) method. As the wage bill shares on the
15As a robustness check, I control for the possibility that the wage-setting process is determined at the
industry level by incorporating in the specification relative wages and replacing the country-year fixed effects
with year fixed effects.
16Country-industry fixed effects are included in the model by deviating all variables from their country-
industry means.
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left-hand side of the equations add up to one, the estimation of the system is feasible only if
one of the equations is eliminated. When both age and skill profiles are considered, I choose
to eliminate the equation that corresponds to the oldest low-skilled workers (50+,LS). When
only the skill profile or the age profile is considered, I choose to eliminate the equation that
corresponds to the low-skilled workers (LS) and the oldest workers (50+), respectively. In
order to ensure that the coefficient estimates are invariant to the equation that is eliminated,
I iterate the SUR method (ISUR).17 Estimates for the parameters that are not directly esti-
mated are obtained from the use of the constraints in (3). Their asymptotic standard errors
are obtained with the use of the delta method.
As mentioned above, ISUR estimations are predicated upon the assumption that all ex-
planatory variables are exogenous. IT and CT, however, may be endogenous as decisions over
the adoption of IT and CT and optimal labour utilisation adjustments are likely to be made
simultaneously by the representative firm, thereby leading to a simultaneity bias. By the
same token, non-ICT capital may also lead to a simultaneity bias. In order to deal with this
issue, I instrument each capital variable using its first and second lags. These instruments are
selected on the basis that they are strongly correlated with the instrumented variables and
uncorrelated with the error terms (Crino`, 2012). Output may be another source of endogene-
ity because it is likely to adjust to shocks rather than remain fixed (Egger & Egger, 2005;
Hijzen, 2005). Therefore, I treat also output as endogenous and instrument it with its first
and second lags.
For the production of the main results, I treat all explanatory variables as endogenous
and estimate the system by Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS). The missing values
for the first- and second-lagged instrumented variables are replaced with zeros (Arellano &
Bond, 1991). In order to account for the relative size of each industry by country, the system
of equations is weighted by the industries’ shares of employment in country-wide employment
in 1982 (Michaels et al., 2014; Graetz & Michaels, 2018).
In addition to the benchmark instrumentation strategy, I implement an alternative one for
the non-ICT, IT and CT intensities. The concept of this strategy is that the non-ICT, IT and
CT intensities of industries in a given year along with the evolution of telephone line installa-
tions and military expenditures of a country could be strong predictors of the future evolution
17The iteration of this method guarantees that the coefficient estimates and the residual covariance matrix
converge (Berndt & Wood, 1975; Hijzen et al., 2005).
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of industry-level non-ICT, IT and CT intensities. Based on this concept, I instrument each
of the three variables by interacting its values in the year 1980 with country-level variables
for the number of telephone lines per capita and the share of military expenditures in GDP.
Data on the two country-level variables are drawn from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators. In addition to telephone lines being a type of communication technology
which can proxy also for non-ICT advancements (e.g. infrastructure, transport equipment)
and for IT advancements (e.g. PCs), military expenditures have often led to the invention
and development of information and communication technologies that have been later com-
mercialised. One of the most notable examples is the Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network (ARPANET) that was initially funded by the US Department of Defense and de-
veloped in the late 1960s. ARPANET was an experimental computer network relying on the
packet-switching technology18 and the first network to implement the protocol suite TCP/IP.
Both technologies were later among the rudimentary elements of the Internet (Castells, 2001).
Therefore, the aforementioned interaction terms are expected to be correlated with the in-
strumented variables. The exogeneity of the instruments is ensured for two reasons. First, the
values of non-ICT, IT and CT intensities correspond to 1980, a year that precedes the start
year of the benchmark sample. Second, the country-level variables used in the interaction
terms are unlikely to impact the industry-level wage bill shares of different worker types. In
these alternative IV estimations, log output is instrumented with its first and second lags, as
in the benchmark IV strategy.
5 Empirical results
I start off the empirical analysis by studying the effects of IT and CT on the skill composi-
tion and age composition of labour demand. The results of I3SLS estimations are shown in
Panel A of Table 2. The first three columns include the system of wage bill share equations
corresponding to the three skill groups of workers, while the last three columns include the
system of wage bill share equations corresponding to the three age groups of workers.
18Digital network that transmits data that are grouped in packets.
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Table 2: IT, CT and worker types by skill and by age
Panel A: Wage bill shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.031*** -0.078*** 0.046*** 0.0050 0.011** -0.016***
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
K 0.0020 -0.0087*** 0.0068*** -0.0012 0.0045** -0.0033**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
IT 0.093*** -0.18*** 0.091*** -0.036*** -0.021** 0.057***
[0.009] [0.01] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007]
CT 0.019 0.069*** -0.088*** 0.095*** -0.010 -0.085***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.647 0.524 0.820 0.685 0.530 0.712
F-test H0: βIT = βCT 0.00123 5.66e-19 1.68e-13 2.68e-10 0.638 2.20e-18
(P-value)
Hansen J statistic 2165.1 819.8
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: Employment shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Esh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.032*** -0.066*** 0.034*** 0.0027 0.0083* -0.011***
[0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003]
K 0.0054*** -0.0063*** 0.00087 -0.0055*** 0.0047*** 0.00076
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
IT 0.083*** -0.17*** 0.083*** -0.046*** 0.0059 0.040***
[0.007] [0.01] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.006]
CT -0.015 0.093*** -0.078*** 0.10*** -0.029 -0.076***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.648 0.650 0.853 0.631 0.548 0.687
Hansen J statistic 2301.2 1017.6
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel C: Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: ln E HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.53*** 0.45*** 0.57*** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.61***
[0.06] [0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06]
K 0.045 0.041 0.083*** 0.073** 0.094*** 0.094***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03]
IT 0.063 0.064 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.48*** 0.69***
[0.1] [0.07] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.10]
CT 1.35*** 0.34*** 0.29 0.67*** 0.20 -0.11
[0.3] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
Obs 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053
R2 0.711 0.681 0.768 0.471 0.479 0.463
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel D: Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: ln W HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.041** 0.028 0.029 0.039** 0.050** 0.040
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
K -0.037*** -0.024* -0.0053 -0.023** -0.028** -0.034**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.010] [0.01] [0.02]
IT 0.12*** 0.083** 0.042 0.088** 0.047 0.14***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05]
CT -0.11 -0.20** -0.21** -0.15* -0.15* -0.20**
[0.1] [0.08] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08]
Obs 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053
R2 0.936 0.959 0.902 0.952 0.963 0.952
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns (1)–(3) and
columns (4)–(6) of Panels A and B. Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with robust standard errors in square brackets in columns
(1)–(3) and columns (4)–(6) of Panels C and D. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations. All
equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote
significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates of IT in columns (1) and
(3) suggest that IT intensity increases the wage bill shares of the high-skilled and low-skilled.
The negative and significant coefficient estimate of IT in column (2) suggests that IT intensity
decreases the wage bill shares of medium-skilled workers. By contrast, CT intensity increases
the wage bill share of the medium-skilled and decreases the wage bill share of the low-skilled, as
suggested by the respective coefficient estimates of CT in columns (2) and (3). The coefficient
estimate of CT in column (1) suggests that there is no statistically significant effect of CT
intensity on the wage bill share of high-skilled workers. Output and non-ICT capital polarise
the demand for skill. In particular, output increases the wage bill shares of the high-skilled and
low-skilled, and decreases the wage bill share of the medium-skilled. Similarly, non-ICT capital
increases the wage bill share of low-skilled workers, while it increases the wage bill share of the
medium-skilled. Related to the literature providing evidence on capital complementing more
skilled labour (i.e., capital-skill complementarity), my analysis, by decomposing capital into
non-ICT, IT and CT, reveals that each of the three skill groups of workers is complementary
to at least one of these types of capital.
In columns (1)–(3) of Panel B, I estimate by I3SLS the same system of equations as
in the first three columns of Panel A after replacing the wage bill shares with employment
shares as the dependent variables, where employment is captured by the hours worked by
persons engaged. This way, I aim at identifying whether the effects shown in Panel A operate
through employment share adjustments. Panel B reveals that the effects of IT and CT on the
employment shares of workers differing in skill are very similar qualitatively and quantitatively
to the effects of the two types of technologies on their wage bill shares, implying that part of
their wage bill share adjustments is accounted for by employment share adjustments.
Given, though, that Panel B shows evidence on the relative employment adjustments of
these worker types to changes in IT and CT intensities, in Panels C and D, I provide suggestive
evidence on the underlying mechanisms of the effects shown in Panel A by making 2SLS
estimations of employment and wage equations. The dependent variable in the equations of
these two panels is the logged employment level and the logged real hourly wage, respectively,
of each worker type. Employment is captured by hours worked by each worker type, while
the real hourly wage is calculated as the ratio of the wage bill of each worker type to its total
hours worked. My IV strategy in these estimations is identical to the one implemented in
I3SLS. That is, I treat all explanatory variables as endogenous and I instrument each with its
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first and second lags. The results in the first three columns of the two panels suggest that the
increase in the employment level of low-skilled workers and the larger increase in the wage
of high-skilled workers compared to the medium-skilled induced by IT explain the effects of
this type of technologies on the wage bill shares of the three skill groups. The effects of CT
on their wage bill shares seem to be explained by the increase in the wages of high-skilled
and medium-skilled workers and the decrease of similar magnitude in the employment levels
of the medium-skilled and low-skilled that are induced by this type of technologies.
Focusing on the three different age groups of workers, the negative and significant coeffi-
cient estimates of IT in columns (4) and (5) of Panel A suggest that IT intensity decreases
the wage bill shares of the youngest and middle-aged workers. The wage bill share of the old-
est workers increase with IT intensity, as suggested by its positive and significant coefficient
estimate in column (6). By contrast, the coefficient estimates of CT in columns (4) and (6)
suggest that CT intensity increases the wage bill share of the youngest, while it decreases the
wage bill share of the oldest. CT intensity exerts no statistically significant effect on the wage
bill share of the middle-aged as the respective coefficient estimate is statistically insignificant
at all conventional levels (column 5). Output and non-ICT capital are biased against the
oldest and in favour of the middle-aged as they decrease the wage bill share of the first worker
type and increase the wage bill share of the second. According to columns (4)–(6) of Panel
B, the effects of IT and CT on the employment shares of workers differing in age are very
similar qualitatively and quantitatively to the effects of the two types of technologies on their
wage bill shares, implying that the wage bill share adjustments are partly accounted for by
employment share adjustments. Identifying the possible underlying mechanisms of the wage
bill share adjustments, columns (4)–(6) of Panels C and D suggest that the effects of IT on
the wage bill shares of different age groups are explained by the larger increase in the employ-
ment level and wage of the oldest workers induced by this type of technologies compared to
younger workers. Also, the increase in the employment level of the youngest and the decrease
of smaller magnitude in the wage of the oldest compared to younger workers that are induced
by CT seem to explain the effects of this type of technologies on the wage bill shares of the
three age groups.
The first-stage results of the I3SLS and 2SLS estimations suggest that the IV strategy that
I implement is successful. In particular, the instruments are correlated with the instrumented
variables as the coefficient estimates of the majority of these are statistically significant, the
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F-statistic is above 10 and its p-value lower than 10%, and the R-squared value is relatively
high. The IV strategy is also successful in all subsequent tables where I make I3SLS or 2SLS
estimations.19 The test for over-identifying restrictions should be treated with caution in
Table 2 and in subsequent tables as the Hansen J statistic is relatively high.20
As IT and CT exert opposite effects on the wage bill shares of the medium-skilled, the low-
skilled, the youngest, and the oldest, I am also interested in identifying the net effects. To this
end, I first confirm that the coefficient estimates of the two key explanatory variables in the
corresponding columns are statistically different from each other so that their magnitudes can
be compared.21 Then, I calculate the standard deviations of IT and CT on the whole sample
and multiply each of these with the respective coefficient estimates of Table 2. Table B1
reveals that the effect of IT intensity dominates the effect of CT intensity in all cases. For
instance, an increase of one standard deviation in the ratio of IT capital stock to value added
results in a decrease of roughly 0.02 in the wage bill share of the medium-skilled. By contrast,
the wage bill share of the same worker type increases by roughly 0.002 due to an increase
of one standard deviation in the ratio of CT capital stock to value added. The economic
magnitudes of the rest of the effects are interpreted similarly. Consequently, the net effect
of IT and CT intensities on the wage bill share of the medium-skilled is negative, while the
net effect on the wage bill share of the low-skilled is positive. These results, in addition to
the positive effect of IT on the wage bill share of the high-skilled, point to the polarisation of
the demand for skill. This is in line with the recent studies that lump IT and CT together
and find that ICT lead to skill polarisation (Michaels et al., 2014; Blanas et al., 2018). In
addition, while the net effect of IT and CT intensities on the wage bill share of the youngest
is negative, the net effect on the wage bill share of the oldest is positive. The second result
challenges the evidence of earlier studies on ICT being biased against workers aged above 50
(Aubert et al., 2006; Behaghel et al., 2014). It is, however, in line with Blanas et al. (2018)
who show that ICT increase the relative demand for the oldest. Also, Blanas et al. (2018)
19The first-stage results of the estimations in Table 2 and in all subsequent tables are available upon request.
20As shown at the bottom of Table 2, the Hansen J statistic of the first system of equations is 2165.1, while
the Hansen J statistic of the second system is 819.8. Either statistic is above the respective degrees of freedom
of the system: Degrees of freedom of the system of equations in columns (1)–(3) = G * m - k = 97, where G:
number of simultaneous regressions (3), m: number of instruments (35), k: number of endogenous variables
(8); Degrees of freedom of the system of equations in columns (4)–(6) = G * m - k = 97, where G = 3, m =
35, k = 8. In estimations where each explanatory variable is instrumented only with its first lag, the Hansen J
statistic becomes smaller, albeit is still greater than the respective degrees of freedom of the system (Table 2
Vs Table C1).
21The p-value of the relevant F-test is below 10% in each of the four columns, implying that the coefficient
estimates of IT and CT are indeed statistically different from each other.
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find a positive, rather than a negative, effect of ICT on the wage bill share of the youngest,
albeit this becomes insignificant in some sub-periods that are examined. Provided that the
faster growth rates of IT intensity of the period 1982–2005 have occurred also since 2005, the
aforementioned net effects of IT and CT intensities may have continued to operate post-2005.
Thus far, I have identified the effects of IT and CT on the skill composition of labour
demand unconditional on age, and on the age composition of labour demand unconditional
on skill. In Panel A of Table B2, I estimate three systems of wage bill share equations
corresponding to workers differing in skill within each age group. Similarly, in Panel B, I
estimate three systems of wage bill share equations corresponding to workers differing in age
within each skill group. The results in the two panels suggest that the effects of the two types
of technologies on the skill composition of labour demand within each age group are very
similar to those identified when age is not accounted for, and that the effects of IT and CT
on the age composition of labour demand within each skill group are very similar to those
identified when skill is not accounted for.
Extending the analysis further, I study the effects of IT and CT on the age-skill com-
position of labour demand, that is, how these two types of technologies lead to inequalities
among workers differing in age and skill. To this end, I estimate system (2) that comprises
nine wage bill share equations, one per worker type. The results are shown in Panel A of
Table 3. The coefficient estimates of IT suggest that IT intensity increases the wage bill
shares of high-skilled and low-skilled workers of all age profiles (columns 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9),
while it decreases the wage bill shares of the medium-skilled of all age profiles (columns 2, 5,
and 8). By contrast, CT intensity increases the wage bill shares of the youngest and middle-
aged medium-skilled (columns 2 and 5) and decreases the wage bill shares of the middle-aged
and oldest low-skilled (columns 6 and 9). Also, CT intensity increases the wage bill shares
of the youngest high-skilled and low-skilled (columns 1 and 3). Output increases the wage
bill shares of the older high-skilled and low-skilled and decreases the wage bill shares of all
the rest. Non-ICT capital increases the wage bill shares of the older high-skilled and the
youngest low-skilled, while it decreases the wage bill shares of the youngest high-skilled and
the youngest and oldest medium-skilled.22
22Same as in Table 2, the test for over-identifying restrictions in the estimations of Panel A of Table 3 should
be treated with caution as the Hansen J statistic is relatively high. In estimations where each explanatory
variable is instrumented only with its first lag, the Hansen J statistic becomes smaller, albeit is still greater
than the respective degrees of freedom of the system (Table C2).
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Table 3: IT, CT and worker types by age-skill
Panel A: Wage bill shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0025* -0.016*** 0.023*** 0.029*** -0.033*** 0.015*** 0.0053*** -0.028*** 0.0075***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.0036*** -0.0040*** 0.0064*** 0.0043*** 0.00065 -0.00045 0.0012* -0.0054*** 0.00086
[0.0005] [0.002] [0.0009] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007]
IT 0.014*** -0.059*** 0.0093** 0.053*** -0.12*** 0.042*** 0.026*** -0.0078* 0.039***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
CT 0.034*** 0.027* 0.034*** -0.0029 0.051*** -0.059*** -0.012 -0.0096 -0.063***
[0.005] [0.02] [0.009] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
Obs 7053
R2 0.300 0.543 0.677 0.541 0.556 0.731 0.629 0.796 0.641
F-test H0: βIT = βCT 0.00199 0.00000471 0.0230 0.00218 9.62e-15 6.65e-09 0.0000296 0.872 5.06e-32
(P-value)
Hansen J statistic 5563.5
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: Employment shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Esh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y 0.0010 -0.016*** 0.018*** 0.028*** -0.027*** 0.0078** 0.0034*** -0.023*** 0.0081***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.0022*** -0.0036** 0.00034 0.0063*** 0.00031 -0.0019 0.0013** -0.0030*** 0.0024***
[0.0005] [0.002] [0.0010] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0005] [0.0008] [0.0008]
IT 0.020*** -0.062*** -0.0046 0.044*** -0.085*** 0.047*** 0.019*** -0.020*** 0.041***
[0.002] [0.009] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
CT 0.023*** 0.052*** 0.030*** -0.028** 0.048*** -0.049*** -0.0098* -0.0066 -0.059***
[0.005] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008]
Obs 7053
R2 0.358 0.499 0.676 0.568 0.678 0.745 0.608 0.820 0.700
Hansen J statistic 5036.8
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel C: Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: ln E (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y 0.54*** 0.52*** 0.67*** 0.51*** 0.45*** 0.56*** 0.53*** 0.43*** 0.56***
[0.09] [0.06] [0.08] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06]
K -0.00090 0.043 0.046 0.059* 0.041 0.088*** 0.043 0.015 0.099***
[0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
IT -0.13 0.023 0.62*** 0.040 0.035 0.32*** -0.091 0.31*** 0.51***
[0.2] [0.09] [0.1] [0.1] [0.08] [0.1] [0.2] [0.09] [0.1]
CT 2.34*** 0.59*** 0.58** 1.14*** 0.15 0.36 1.29*** 0.10 -0.26
[0.6] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.1] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2] [0.3]
Obs 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053
R2 0.384 0.507 0.562 0.710 0.777 0.819 0.460 0.752 0.608
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel D: Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: ln W (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y 0.051** 0.019 0.019 0.028 0.036 0.033 0.046* 0.015 -0.0067
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
K -0.019* -0.028** -0.011 -0.044*** -0.020 -0.0047 -0.029** -0.029 -0.024
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.010] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
IT 0.095** -0.030 0.097* 0.044 0.032 -0.025 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.067
[0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06]
CT 0.025 -0.21** -0.10 -0.083 -0.13 -0.18** 0.17 -0.23*** -0.19*
[0.1] [0.09] [0.1] [0.1] [0.09] [0.09] [0.1] [0.07] [0.1]
Obs 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053 7053
R2 0.882 0.948 0.831 0.932 0.955 0.890 0.834 0.939 0.912
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in Panels A and B. Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with robust standard errors
in square brackets in Panels C and D. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment
in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Estimating a system of nine employment share equations by I3SLS, I show in Panel B
that the effects of IT and CT on the employment shares of workers differing in age and
skill bear a very close resemblance in qualitative and quantitative terms to the effects shown
in Panel A. Hence, their employment share adjustments partly account for their wage bill
share adjustments to IT and CT intensities. According to the results of I2SLS estimations
of employment and wage equations in Panels C and D of Table 3, I find that the effects
of IT identified in Panel A are explained by this type of technologies leading to relatively
large increases in the employment levels of the low-skilled of all age profiles and to relatively
large increases in the wages of the youngest high-skilled and low-skilled and of the oldest
high-skilled. Regarding the effects of CT identified in Panel A, these are explained by the
relatively large increases in the employment levels of the youngest high-skilled and medium-
skilled and the decreases of similar magnitude in the wages of the middle-aged and oldest
low-skilled workers that are induced by this type of technologies.
As IT and CT intensities exert opposite effects on the wage bill shares of the youngest and
middle-aged medium-skilled and of the middle-aged and oldest low-skilled, I identify their
net effects by doing the same exercise as in Table 2. After confirming that the coefficient
estimates of the two key explanatory variables are statistically different from each other in
the corresponding columns and their magnitudes can be compared,23 I multiply the standard
deviations of IT and CT on the whole sample with their respective coefficient estimates in
Table 3 in order to obtain the economic magnitude of each effect. The effect of IT intensity
dominates the effect of CT intensity in all cases, as shown in Table B3. For instance, while
an increase of one standard deviation in the ratio of IT capital stock leads to a decrease
of roughly 0.003 in the wage bill share of the youngest medium-skilled, an increase of one
standard deviation in the ratio of CT capital stock leads to an increase of roughly 0.00085 in
the wage bill share of the same worker type. The interpretation of the economic magnitudes
of the rest of the effects is similar. Consequently, the net effects of IT and CT intensities on
the wage bill shares of the youngest and middle-aged medium-skilled are negative, while the
net effects of the two types of technologies on the wage bill shares of the middle-aged and
oldest low-skilled are positive. These net effects are likely to be in operation post-2005, if the
faster growth rates of IT intensity over 1982–2005 have taken place also since 2005.
23The p-values of the relevant F-tests, shown at the bottom of Table 3, are below 10%.
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Heterogeneous effects of IT and CT across sub-periods, sectors, countries
Having discussed the main results, in the next two tables I look into heterogeneous effects
of IT and CT between different sub-periods. The reason for this exercise is the unprecedented
high rate at which IT and CT developed and expanded every year over the last decades,
including over 1982–2005, as shown in Figure 4. For instance, the processing and storage
capacities of personal computers (PCs) in the 2000s were much greater than the processing
and storage capacities of PCs in the 1990s, which, in turn, were much greater than those in
the 1980s. In addition, the operating systems on which PCs have run since the mid-1990s (e.g.
launch of Windows 95 and all subsequent versions) have been much more user-friendly than
the operating systems on which PCs ran in the 1980s (e.g. MS-DOS, IBM PC DOS). These
are two of the reasons for which PCs have become highly commercialised and been used en
masse for personal and professional purposes. Similarly, data networks (i.e., intranet) were
better customised to business needs and operations in the 2000s than data networks in the
1990s, which, in turn, were themselves better customised to business needs and operations
than those available in the 1980s.
For the purpose of this exercise, I create dummy variables for different year bins within
the sample period 1982–2005 which I, then, interact with IT and CT intensities in wage bill
share equations. As IT and CT intensities are treated as endogenous, they are instrumented
with their first and second lags also when they are in the interaction terms. In Panel A of
Tables 4 and 5, I use dummies for 8-year bins (i.e., 1982–1989, 1990–1997, 1998–2005) where
the first 8-year bin is the reference group. In Panel B of the two tables, I use dummies for
4-year bins (i.e., 1982–1985, 1986–1989, 1990–1993, 1994–1997, 1998–2001, 2002–2005) where
the reference group is the first 4-year bin. The dummies for the year bins do not enter the
model individually as they are captured by the fixed effects. I start with the analysis of
heterogeneous effects of IT and CT between different sub-periods on the skill composition
and age composition of labour demand. The coefficient estimates of IT and CT in Panel A
of Table 4 suggest that neither IT intensity nor CT intensity exert statistically significant
effects on the wage bill shares of different skill groups prior to 1990. Similarly, CT intensity
exerts no statistically significant effects on the wage bill shares of different age groups in the
same sub-period. The only statistically significant effects over this sub-period are exerted by
IT intensity on the wage bill shares of different age groups. In line with the main results, IT
intensity increases the wage bill share of the oldest and decreases the wage bill share of the
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middle-aged prior to 1990.
Table 4: Heterogeneous effects by skill and by age across sub-periods
Panel A: IT and CT interacted with 8-year bins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.029*** -0.076*** 0.047*** 0.0050 0.0076 -0.013***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003]
K 0.0018 -0.0085*** 0.0067*** -0.0012 0.0045** -0.0033**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
IT -0.018 -0.068 0.086 0.12 -0.28*** 0.17***
[0.08] [0.1] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09] [0.06]
CT -0.031 0.042 -0.011 0.013 -0.014 0.00081
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
IT * D 1990-1997 0.22*** -0.25*** 0.029 -0.11 0.21*** -0.10**
[0.07] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05]
IT * D 1998-2005 0.11 -0.12 0.0031 -0.14* 0.25*** -0.11*
[0.08] [0.1] [0.09] [0.07] [0.08] [0.06]
CT * D 1990-1997 0.0046 0.015 -0.020** 0.018** 0.0043 -0.022***
[0.008] [0.01] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006]
CT * D 1998-2005 0.025*** 0.011 -0.036*** 0.039*** 0.0073 -0.046***
[0.009] [0.01] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.649 0.526 0.821 0.687 0.532 0.715
Hansen J statistic 2218.5 811.5
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: IT and CT interacted with 4-year bins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.027*** -0.075*** 0.048*** 0.0052 0.0054 -0.011***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003]
K 0.0015 -0.0085*** 0.0070*** -0.0011 0.0045** -0.0034***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
IT -0.20 -0.038 0.24 0.074 -0.58*** 0.51***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
CT -0.042 0.031 0.011 0.0048 -0.012 0.0076
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02]
IT * D 1986-1989 0.27 -0.12 -0.16 0.083 0.26 -0.34***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
IT * D 1990-1993 0.39** -0.25 -0.14 0.053 0.38** -0.44***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
IT * D 1994-1997 0.45** -0.34 -0.10 -0.099 0.52*** -0.42***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
IT * D 1998-2001 0.37** -0.23 -0.14 -0.097 0.55*** -0.45***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
IT * D 2002-2005 0.28 -0.13 -0.15 -0.100 0.55*** -0.45***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
CT * D 1986-1989 0.0080 0.0077 -0.016 0.0072 0.0039 -0.011
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.008]
CT * D 1990-1993 0.011 0.014 -0.025** 0.019* 0.0025 -0.022***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.008]
CT * D 1994-1997 0.0085 0.027* -0.035*** 0.025** 0.0088 -0.034***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.009]
CT * D 1998-2001 0.022* 0.025 -0.047*** 0.041*** 0.0028 -0.044***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.009]
CT * D 2002-2005 0.038*** 0.010 -0.049*** 0.046*** 0.016 -0.062***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.009]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.651 0.529 0.821 0.687 0.533 0.716
Hansen J statistic 2123.5 843.7
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns
(1)–(3) and columns (4)–(6) of both panels. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations.
All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks
denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous effects by age-skill across sub-periods
Panel A: IT and CT interacted with 8-year bins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0028** -0.015*** 0.023*** 0.026*** -0.034*** 0.016*** 0.0056*** -0.027*** 0.0084***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.0036*** -0.0039*** 0.0064*** 0.0043*** 0.00074 -0.00058 0.0012 -0.0053*** 0.00091
[0.0005] [0.002] [0.0009] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007]
IT 0.057** 0.049 0.0095 -0.10 -0.25*** 0.072 0.026 0.14*** 0.0042
[0.02] [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.08] [0.06] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03]
CT 0.0040 -0.010 0.019 -0.045** 0.055** -0.024 0.011 -0.0025 -0.0072
[0.008] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
IT * D 1990-1997 -0.0042 -0.11* 0.0044 0.20*** -0.0040 0.013 0.019 -0.13*** 0.012
[0.02] [0.06] [0.03] [0.06] [0.07] [0.06] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
IT * D 1998-2005 -0.039* -0.10 0.00092 0.15** 0.13* -0.029 -0.00034 -0.14*** 0.031
[0.02] [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.08] [0.06] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03]
CT * D 1990-1997 0.0059** 0.0047 0.0073* 0.0027 0.012 -0.010 -0.0040 -0.0017 -0.017***
[0.002] [0.007] [0.004] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
CT * D 1998-2005 0.015*** 0.018** 0.0062 0.022*** -0.00014 -0.015** -0.012*** -0.0068 -0.028***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.004] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Obs 7053
R2 0.307 0.544 0.677 0.543 0.558 0.732 0.630 0.798 0.645
Hansen J statistic 5512.9
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: IT and CT interacted with 4-year bins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0032** -0.015*** 0.023*** 0.025*** -0.035*** 0.016*** 0.0059*** -0.026*** 0.0090***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.0037*** -0.0038** 0.0064*** 0.0040*** 0.00085 -0.00040 0.0011 -0.0055*** 0.0010
[0.0005] [0.002] [0.0009] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007]
IT -0.046 0.027 0.092 -0.21 -0.45** 0.074 0.057 0.38*** 0.070
[0.06] [0.2] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1] [0.08] [0.09] [0.07]
CT -0.00056 -0.0088 0.014 -0.049** 0.045 -0.0088 0.0069 -0.0050 0.0057
[0.008] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
IT * D 1986-1989 0.14*** 0.030 -0.087 0.16 0.092 0.0045 -0.029 -0.24*** -0.073
[0.05] [0.1] [0.08] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1] [0.07] [0.08] [0.06]
IT * D 1990-1993 0.14*** -0.0091 -0.080 0.26* 0.088 0.034 -0.017 -0.32*** -0.097
[0.05] [0.1] [0.08] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1] [0.07] [0.08] [0.07]
IT * D 1994-1997 0.093* -0.12 -0.071 0.36** 0.15 0.0041 -0.0060 -0.38*** -0.036
[0.05] [0.1] [0.09] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1] [0.07] [0.08] [0.07]
IT * D 1998-2001 0.082 -0.099 -0.080 0.32** 0.26 -0.029 -0.029 -0.39*** -0.034
[0.05] [0.2] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1] [0.07] [0.09] [0.07]
IT * D 2002-2005 0.061 -0.079 -0.081 0.25 0.33* -0.032 -0.030 -0.38*** -0.035
[0.05] [0.2] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1] [0.08] [0.09] [0.07]
CT * D 1986-1989 0.0034 -0.0011 0.0050 0.0027 0.0081 -0.0069 0.0019 0.00075 -0.014***
[0.003] [0.009] [0.005] [0.009] [0.01] [0.009] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
CT * D 1990-1993 0.0064* 0.0025 0.010* 0.0050 0.011 -0.013 0.000038 0.00035 -0.022***
[0.003] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.01] [0.009] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
CT * D 1994-1997 0.0095*** 0.0051 0.010* 0.0038 0.023** -0.018** -0.0048 -0.0020 -0.027***
[0.003] [0.01] [0.006] [0.010] [0.01] [0.009] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
CT * D 1998-2001 0.016*** 0.018* 0.0077 0.014 0.011 -0.022** -0.0076 -0.0037 -0.033***
[0.004] [0.01] [0.006] [0.01] [0.01] [0.010] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
CT * D 2002-2005 0.018*** 0.016 0.011* 0.033*** 0.0028 -0.019* -0.013** -0.0088 -0.040***
[0.004] [0.01] [0.006] [0.01] [0.01] [0.010] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
Obs 7053
R2 0.311 0.545 0.677 0.546 0.559 0.732 0.630 0.798 0.646
Hansen J statistic 5519.4
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in both panels. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in
all equations. All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and
10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
The coefficient estimates of the interaction terms suggest that IT intensity increases the
wage bill shares of the high-skilled and decreases the wage bill shares of the medium-skilled
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during the period 1990–1997, but these effects disappear from 1998 onwards. In addition, IT
intensity decreases the wage bill share of the middle-aged in both 1990–1997 and 1998–2005,
albeit less than prior to 1990, as the respective coefficient estimates are positive and significant
but of smaller size than the negative and significant coefficient estimate of the non-interacted
IT. The wage bill share of the youngest also decreases with IT intensity over 1998–2005.
By contrast, IT intensity increases the wage bill share of the oldest in both 1990–1997 and
1998–2005, albeit less than prior to 1990, as the respective coefficient estimates are negative
and significant but of smaller size than the positive and significant coefficient estimate of the
non-interacted IT. CT intensity decreases the wage bill share of the low-skilled in both 1990–
1997 and 1998–2005 and increases the wage bill share of the high-skilled only as of 1998. In
addition, CT intensity increases the wage bill share of the youngest and decreases the wage
bill share of the oldest in both 1990–1997 and 1998–2005.
The analysis in Panel A reveals that the effects of IT and CT on the skill composition
and age composition of labour demand that I identify for the whole sample period are mostly
driven by the post-1990 period. This is also confirmed by estimations in which I consider
shorter sub-periods. Indeed, the coefficient estimates of non-interacted IT and CT and of
their interactions with dummies for 4-year bins in Panel B suggest that there is only one
statistically significant effect over 1986–1989 and only two prior to 1986, while the majority
of the effects, that are in line with the main results, are identified for the post-1990 period.
Same as in the analysis in the previous table, Panel A of Table 5 reveals that there are
very few statistically significant effects of IT and CT on the age-skill composition of labour
demand prior to 1990. Instead, the majority of the effects that I identify for the whole sample
period are accounted for by effects identified for the post-1990 sub-periods. In particular, the
coefficient estimates in Panel A suggest that the negative effect of IT intensity on the wage
bill share of the youngest medium-skilled is identified only for the period 1990–1997, while the
negative effect of IT intensity on the wage bill share of the oldest medium-skilled is identified
only for the periods 1990–1997 and 1998–2005. Also, CT intensity increases the wage bill
share of the youngest high-skilled only for the periods 1990–1997 and 1998–2005, while it
increases the wage bill share of the youngest medium-skilled only for the post-1998 period.
Similarly, the negative effect of CT intensity on the wage bill share of the oldest low-skilled is
identified only for the periods 1990–1997 and 1998–2005, while its negative effect on the wage
bill share of the middle-aged low-skilled is identified only for the post-1998 period.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous effects by skill and by age across sectors and across countries
Panel A: IT and CT interacted with sector dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.028*** -0.067*** 0.038*** 0.0025 0.016*** -0.018***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003]
K 0.00089 -0.0065*** 0.0056*** -0.0016 0.0069*** -0.0053***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
IT -0.12 1.13*** -1.01*** -0.21** 0.90*** -0.69***
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.09] [0.1] [0.07]
CT 0.67* 1.26** -1.94*** 0.046 -1.32*** 1.28***
[0.4] [0.5] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.3]
IT * D mining 0.0016 -1.02*** 1.02*** 0.011 -0.73*** 0.72***
[0.1] [0.2] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.10]
IT * D manufacturing 0.17* -1.19*** 1.03*** 0.091 -0.75*** 0.66***
[0.10] [0.1] [0.1] [0.09] [0.1] [0.07]
IT * D services 0.19* -1.28*** 1.09*** 0.19** -0.93*** 0.74***
[0.10] [0.1] [0.1] [0.09] [0.1] [0.07]
IT * D utilities 0.15 -1.26*** 1.11*** 0.19** -0.91*** 0.72***
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.10] [0.1] [0.08]
IT * D construct -0.55*** -0.58*** 1.13*** 0.58*** -1.22*** 0.64***
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.08]
CT * D mining -0.24 -1.64*** 1.89*** 0.22 0.98* -1.20***
[0.5] [0.6] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5] [0.4]
CT * D manufacturing -0.72* -0.75 1.47*** 0.33 0.60 -0.94***
[0.4] [0.5] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.3]
CT * D services -0.65* -1.20** 1.85*** 0.038 1.33*** -1.37***
[0.4] [0.5] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.3]
CT * D utilities -0.53 -1.12** 1.65*** 0.015 1.31*** -1.33***
[0.4] [0.5] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.3]
CT * D construct -1.20*** -0.49 1.69*** 0.11 1.26*** -1.37***
[0.4] [0.5] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.3]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.660 0.545 0.825 0.690 0.551 0.723
Hansen J statistic 992.2 2600.3
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: IT and CT interacted with country-wide union density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.029*** -0.074*** 0.045*** 0.0056 0.015*** -0.020***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004]
K 0.0012 -0.0052* 0.0040* -0.0011 0.0058*** -0.0046***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
IT 0.13*** -0.25*** 0.12*** -0.16*** -0.047** 0.21***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
CT 0.050** 0.11*** -0.16*** 0.12*** 0.048* -0.17***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
IT * UD -0.12*** 0.079 0.037 0.31*** 0.039 -0.35***
[0.04] [0.06] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.03]
CT * UD -0.15*** 0.013 0.13** 0.0076 -0.24*** 0.23***
[0.06] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.04]
Obs 6063 6063
R2 0.644 0.532 0.840 0.651 0.464 0.714
Hansen J statistic 2647.3 1255.3
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns (1)–(3)
and columns (4)–(6) of both panels. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations
are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at
1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table 7: Heterogeneous effects by age-skill across sectors and across countries
Panel A: IT and CT interacted with sector dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0020 -0.016*** 0.021*** 0.028*** -0.022*** 0.0096*** 0.0023 -0.029*** 0.0080***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.0036*** -0.0038** 0.0058*** 0.0038** 0.0031* -0.000011 0.00075 -0.0059*** -0.00022
[0.0005] [0.002] [0.0009] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007]
IT -0.10*** 0.16* -0.26*** 0.078 1.23*** -0.41*** -0.094** -0.25*** -0.34***
[0.03] [0.08] [0.05] [0.08] [0.10] [0.08] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
CT 0.061 0.23 -0.25 0.71** 0.64* -2.67*** -0.10 0.39** 0.98***
[0.1] [0.3] [0.2] [0.3] [0.4] [0.3] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
IT * D mining 0.0055 -0.26** 0.27*** -0.042 -1.08*** 0.38*** 0.038 0.32*** 0.37***
[0.04] [0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05]
IT * D manufacturing 0.11*** -0.24*** 0.23*** -0.010 -1.18*** 0.44*** 0.071* 0.22*** 0.36***
[0.03] [0.08] [0.05] [0.08] [0.09] [0.08] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
IT * D services 0.11*** -0.20** 0.28*** -0.040 -1.33*** 0.45*** 0.12*** 0.25*** 0.37***
[0.03] [0.08] [0.05] [0.08] [0.09] [0.08] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
IT * D utilities 0.083*** -0.21** 0.32*** -0.037 -1.31*** 0.43*** 0.10** 0.26*** 0.35***
[0.03] [0.09] [0.05] [0.09] [0.1] [0.08] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
IT * D construct 0.045 0.080 0.45*** -0.46*** -1.03*** 0.26*** -0.14*** 0.37*** 0.42***
[0.03] [0.09] [0.05] [0.09] [0.1] [0.09] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
CT * D mining 0.18 -0.41 0.46* -0.68 -0.68 2.34*** 0.26 -0.55** -0.91***
[0.1] [0.4] [0.2] [0.4] [0.5] [0.4] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
CT * D manufacturing 0.085 -0.017 0.27 -0.87*** -0.52 1.99*** 0.069 -0.22 -0.79***
[0.1] [0.3] [0.2] [0.3] [0.4] [0.3] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
CT * D services -0.031 -0.21 0.28 -0.71** -0.58 2.62*** 0.089 -0.41** -1.05***
[0.1] [0.3] [0.2] [0.3] [0.4] [0.3] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
CT * D utilities -0.040 -0.16 0.22 -0.57* -0.61 2.50*** 0.086 -0.35* -1.07***
[0.1] [0.3] [0.2] [0.3] [0.4] [0.3] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
CT * D construct -0.035 -0.19 0.34* -1.05*** -0.16 2.47*** -0.11 -0.15 -1.12***
[0.1] [0.3] [0.2] [0.3] [0.4] [0.3] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
Obs 7053
R2 0.308 0.546 0.686 0.551 0.580 0.741 0.641 0.801 0.661
Hansen J statistic 6835.2
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: IT and CT interacted with country-wide union density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0019 -0.020*** 0.028*** 0.026*** -0.023*** 0.012*** 0.0057*** -0.031*** 0.0050**
[0.001] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
K -0.0035*** -0.0045** 0.0069*** 0.0040** 0.0043** -0.0025 0.00072 -0.0049*** -0.00043
[0.0006] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.0008] [0.001] [0.0008]
IT 0.0061 -0.15*** -0.011 0.046*** -0.15*** 0.059*** 0.074*** 0.054*** 0.077***
[0.006] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.009] [0.01] [0.009]
CT 0.040*** 0.040* 0.041*** 0.034 0.11*** -0.093*** -0.024** -0.036*** -0.11***
[0.007] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
IT * UD 0.012 0.20*** 0.097*** -0.020 0.032 0.028 -0.11*** -0.15*** -0.087***
[0.01] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
CT * UD -0.036** 0.067 -0.024 -0.16*** -0.14** 0.057 0.047** 0.085*** 0.099***
[0.02] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Obs 6063
R2 0.255 0.490 0.680 0.499 0.553 0.746 0.624 0.805 0.668
Hansen J statistic 8483.3
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in both panels. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all
equations. All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*).
For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
Although the development and expansion of IT and CT have taken place at an unprece-
dented rate in recent decades, the adoption rate of the two types of technologies differs across
sectors and industries, as shown in Panel B of Table A2. In order to identify potential hetero-
geneous effects of IT and CT across sectors, I first split the economy in agriculture, mining,
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manufacturing, services, utilities, and construction.24 Then, I estimate systems of wage bill
share equations for different worker types augmented with interaction terms of IT and CT
intensities with dummies for the last five sectors, as I treat agriculture as the reference group.
Sector dummies do not enter the model individually as they are captured by the fixed effects.
As IT and CT intensities are treated as endogenous, they are instrumented with their first
and second lags also when they are in the interaction terms.
Indeed, the effects of IT and CT intensities on the skill composition and age composition
of labour demand across sectors are heterogeneous and are shown in Table 6. Same as the
main results, IT intensity increases the wage bill share of low-skilled workers in all sectors but
agriculture. The magnitude of the positive effects is the strongest in construction and utilities.
CT intensity decreases the wage bill share of the same type of workers in all sectors, with
the strongest negative effects being identified in agriculture and manufacturing. The positive
effect of IT on the wage bill share of high-skilled workers is accounted for by manufacturing
and services. The magnitude of the positive effect is slightly larger in services than in man-
ufacturing. Manufacturing, services and utilities are the sectors where IT intensity decreases
the wage bill share of medium-skilled workers. Among these three sectors, the strongest neg-
ative effect is identified in services. Also, the positive effect of CT intensity on the wage bill
share of medium-skilled workers is accounted for by mining, services and utilities, with the
strongest effect being exerted in the first sector.
The coefficient estimates in the last three columns suggest that the negative effect of IT
intensity on the wage bill share of the youngest workers and the negative effect on the wage
bill share of the middle-aged are accounted for by services, utilities and construction. Among
these sectors, the strongest positive and negative effects are identified in construction. The
positive effect of IT intensity on the wage bill share of the oldest is accounted for by mining,
services and utilities, with the strongest effect being exerted in services. Also, the negative
effect of CT intensity on the wage bill share of the oldest is accounted for by services, utilities
and construction, with the strongest effect being exerted in the first and the third sector.
Same as in the previous table, the results in Table 7 reveal that that there are heteroge-
neous effects of IT and CT on the age-skill composition of labour demand across sectors. In
particular, the positive effect of IT intensity on the wage bill share of the youngest high-skilled
24The NACE Rev. 1.1 of these sectors are: agriculture (AtB), mining (C), manufacturing (15–16, 17–19, 20,
21–22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27–28, 29, 30–33, 34–35, 36–37), services (50, 51, 52, 60–63, 64, 70, 71–74, J, H, L, M,
N, O), utilities (E), and construction (F).
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is accounted for by manufacturing and services, where the magnitude of the effect is identi-
cal. The positive effect of IT intensity on the wage bill share of the youngest low-skilled is
accounted for by all sectors but manufacturing, with construction being the sector where the
strongest effect is identified. Manufacturing, services and utilities are the three sectors where
IT intensity increases the wage bill share of the middle-aged low-skilled, with the largest in-
crease being identified in services. The negative effect of IT intensity on the wage bill share of
the youngest medium-skilled is accounted for by all sectors but construction, while its negative
effect on the wage bill share of the middle-aged medium-skilled is identified in services and
utilities. In the first case, the strongest negative effects are exerted in mining and manufactur-
ing, while in the second case, the strongest negative effect is exerted in services. In addition,
the negative effect of CT intensity on the wage bill share of the middle-aged low-skilled is
accounted for by all sectors, with the strongest effect being identified in manufacturing. The
negative effect of CT intensity on the wage bill share of the oldest low-skilled is accounted
for by services, utilities and construction, with the strongest effect being identified in the last
sector.
Having identified heterogeneous effects of IT and CT on the wage bill shares of different
worker types across sub-periods and across sectors, my next goal is to look into heterogeneous
effects across countries. Given that collective bargaining can determine the wage-setting
process and other terms of employment, I aim at exploiting the cross-country variation in this
dimension. To this purpose, I use union density, calculated as the ratio of union members to
the total number of employees, as a proxy for country-level collective bargaining and interact
it with IT and CT intensities. Data on union density are drawn from the OECD.25 Union
density does not enter the model individually as it is captured by country-year fixed effects. As
IT intensity, CT intensity and union density are treated as endogenous, they are instrumented
with their first and second lags also when they are in the interaction terms. The results of
estimations of wage bill share equations augmented with these interaction terms are shown in
Panel B of Tables 6 and 7.
From both tables a clear pattern arises: the inequalities generated by IT and CT among
workers with different skill, different age, and different age-skill profiles are smaller in countries
25Collective bargaining coverage is a broader measure of collective bargaining developed by the OECD as it
also includes workers who are covered by the negotiations made by trade unions, albeit they are not members
of them. Unfortunately, the missing information on this measure for the countries examined in this paper is
such that makes its use inappropriate (i.e., more than two thirds of the observations of the benchmark sample
are dropped when this measure is used in lieu of union density.
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with higher union density. In particular, the positive effects of IT and CT intensities on the
wage bill share of high-skilled workers and the negative effect of CT intensity on the wage bill
share of low-skilled workers are dampened by higher union density. Similarly, higher union
density dampens the positive and negative effects of IT intensity on the wage bill shares of
the oldest and the youngest, respectively, as well as the positive effect of CT intensity on
the wage bill share of the middle-aged and its negative effect on the wage bill share of the
oldest. Looking at age-skill groups, while higher union density dampens the negative effect
of IT intensity on the wage bill share of the youngest medium-skilled, it also dampens its
positive effects on the wage bill shares of the oldest high-skilled and low-skilled. Similarly,
higher union density dampens the positive effects of CT intensity on the wage bill shares of
the youngest and middle-aged high-skilled and the middle-aged medium-skilled, as well as its
negative effects on the wage bill shares of the oldest of all skill profiles.
Alternative IV strategy and non-IV
For the production of the main results, I treat all explanatory variables as endogenous using
as instruments their first and second lags. In addition to the benchmark instrumentation
strategy, I implement an alternative one for the non-ICT, IT and CT intensities, while I
instrument log output with its first and second lags. In particular, I instrument each of the
three variables by interacting its values in the year 1980 with country-level variables for the
number of telephone lines per capita and the share of military expenditures in GDP. Data
on the two country-level variables are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. As described in detail in Section 4, a telephone line is a type of communication
technology which can proxy also for non-ICT advancements (e.g. infrastructure, transport
equipment) and for IT advancements (e.g. PCs). Also, military expenditures have often led
to the invention and development of information and communication technologies that have
been later commercialised (e.g. key technologies of the ARPANET as rudimentary elements
of the Internet). Hence, the non-ICT, IT and CT intensities of industries in a given year along
with the evolution of telephone line installations and military expenditures of a country are
expected to be strong predictors of the future evolution of industry-level non-ICT, IT and CT
intensities. In other words, the instruments that I use are expected to be correlated with the
instrumented variables. The exogeneity of the instruments is ensured for two reasons. First,
the values of non-ICT, IT and CT intensities correspond to 1980, a year that precedes the
start year of the benchmark sample. Second, the country-level variables used in the interaction
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terms are unlikely to impact the industry-level wage bill shares of different worker types.
Table 8: IT, CT and worker types by skill and by age (alternative IV and non-IV)
Panel A: Alternative IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y -0.028*** -0.0073 0.035*** 0.016** 0.00068 -0.016***
[0.009] [0.010] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006]
K -0.031*** 0.019*** 0.011** 0.0073* -0.0058 -0.0016
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
IT 0.29*** -0.35*** 0.051* 0.041* -0.10*** 0.063***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
CT 0.019 0.057 -0.075* 0.086** 0.035 -0.12***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03]
Obs 5317 5317
R2 0.528 0.392 0.808 0.706 0.472 0.740
Hansen J statistic 653.2 909.5
Instruments for ln Y First and second lags of instrumented variable
Instruments for K, IT, CT
K, IT, CT in year 1980 interacted with telephone lines per capita
K, IT, CT in year 1980 interacted with share of military expenditure in GDP
Panel B: Non-IV strategy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.022*** -0.048*** 0.026*** 0.013*** -0.0061*** -0.0068***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
K -0.00060 -0.0046*** 0.0052*** 0.0014*** -0.0022*** 0.00074**
[0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0003]
IT 0.098*** -0.20*** 0.097*** -0.013*** 0.015*** -0.0013
[0.008] [0.01] [0.009] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003]
CT 0.011 0.043** -0.054*** 0.053*** 0.015 -0.068***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.009] [0.01] [0.007]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.648 0.530 0.822 0.719 0.553 0.723
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns (1)–(3) and columns
(4)–(6) of Panel A. Iterated Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (ISUR) with robust standard errors in square brackets in columns (1)–(3) and
columns (4)–(6) of Panel B. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations are weighted by the share
of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For
the description of the variables, see Table C13.
The results of the alternative IV strategy are shown in Panel A of Tables 8 and 9 and bear
a very close resemblance to the main ones in terms of sign and precision. In terms of size,
most of the coefficient estimates of IT and CT intensities are larger compared to the main
ones. The first-stage results of all these estimations suggest that the alternative IV strategies
are successful, as the coefficient estimates of the instruments are statistically significant, the
F-statistic is above 10 and its p-value lower than 10%, and the R-squared value is relatively
high.26 Assuming that all explanatory variables are exogenous, in Panel B of the same tables,
26I obtain very similar results to the main ones also when I instrument the non-ICT, IT and CT intensities
only with their values in 1980 interacted with the number of telephone lines per capita or only with their
values in 1980 interacted with the share of military expenditures in GDP. Similarly, the results remain largely
unchanged when I implement the alternative IV strategies using in the interaction terms the values of IT and
CT intensities in 1982 rather than 1980. The relevant tables are available upon request.
37
I show the results of ISUR estimations of the main specification. Their similarity to the IV
results suggests that endogeneity may not be a major issue in the specification.
Table 9: IT, CT and worker types by age-skill (alternative IV and non-IV)
Panel A: Alternative IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.012*** 0.015*** 0.013*** -0.011 0.0017 0.0096* -0.0050 -0.024*** 0.012***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.003] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
K -0.010*** 0.012*** 0.0055** -0.018*** 0.013** -0.00027 -0.0023 -0.0051** 0.0058***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
IT 0.068*** -0.087*** 0.060*** 0.20*** -0.23*** -0.073*** 0.030** -0.031** 0.064***
[0.009] [0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
CT 0.041*** 0.011 0.033* -0.0042 0.062 -0.023 -0.018 -0.016 -0.085***
[0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Obs 5317
R2 0.153 0.639 0.600 0.340 0.428 0.702 0.645 0.788
Hansen J statistic 4005.4
Instruments for ln Y First and second lags of instrumented variable
Instruments for K, IT, CT
K, IT, CT in year 1980 interacted with telephone lines per capita
K, IT, CT in year 1980 interacted with share of military expenditure in GDP
Panel B: Non-IV strategy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y 0.0010 -0.0016 0.015*** 0.019*** -0.024*** 0.0032* 0.0021** -0.023*** 0.0019**
[0.0007] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.0010] [0.001] [0.0008]
K -0.0029*** -0.0014** 0.0042*** 0.0017*** 0.00049 -0.00058 0.00067** -0.0037*** 0.00050***
[0.0002] [0.0007] [0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0008] [0.0006] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0002]
IT 0.013*** -0.064*** 0.016*** 0.056*** -0.13*** 0.043*** 0.029*** -0.0046 0.0017
[0.002] [0.007] [0.004] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002]
CT 0.022*** 0.010 0.028*** -0.0053 0.042*** -0.033*** -0.0058 -0.0098 -0.039***
[0.004] [0.01] [0.007] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004]
Obs 7053
R2 0.303 0.546 0.679 0.542 0.558 0.733 0.629 0.797 0.653
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in Panel A. Iterated Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (ISUR) with robust standard
errors in square brackets in Panel B. All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5%
(**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
Discussion
In summary, when I study the effects of IT and CT on the skill composition and age
composition of labour demand, I find that IT intensity increases the relative demands for
the high-skilled, low-skilled and oldest workers, while it decreases the relative demands for
the medium-skilled and younger workers. CT intensity exerts opposite effects: it decreases
the relative demands for the low-skilled and the oldest workers, and increases the relative
demands for the medium-skilled and the youngest. I identify very similar effects of IT and
CT on the skill composition of labour demand within each of the three age groups, and on
the age composition of labour demand within each of the three skill groups. As suggestive
evidence of the underlying mechanisms, I show that the effects of IT intensity operate through
an increase in the employment level of low-skilled workers, a larger increase in the wage of
high-skilled workers compared to the medium-skilled, and a larger increase in the employment
level and wage of the oldest workers. The effects of CT intensity operate through an increase
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in the wages of high-skilled and medium-skilled workers, a decrease of similar magnitude in
the employment levels of the medium-skilled and low-skilled, an increase in the employment
level of the youngest, and a decrease of smaller magnitude in the wage of the oldest compared
to younger workers.
Studying the effects of IT and CT on the age-skill composition of labour demand, I find
that IT intensity increases the relative demands for the high-skilled and low-skilled of all age
profiles, while it decreases the relative demands for the medium-skilled of all age profiles.
CT intensity exerts mostly opposite effects: it decreases the relative demands for older low-
skilled workers and increases the relative demands for the younger more skilled. Identifying
the underlying mechanisms, I show that the effects of IT intensity operate through relatively
large increases in the employment levels of the low-skilled of all age profiles and relatively
large increases in the wages of the youngest high-skilled and low-skilled and of the oldest
high-skilled. The effects of CT intensity operate through relatively large increases in the
employment levels of the youngest high-skilled and medium-skilled and decreases of similar
magnitude in the wages of the middle-aged and oldest low-skilled workers.
Accounting for the advancements of IT and CT over time, the different adoption rates of
the two types of technologies across industries and sectors, as well as the different levels of
union density across countries, I obtain very interesting results. First, I find that the afore-
mentioned effects are in operation mostly from 1990 onwards, when IT and CT advancements
took place at an even higher rate compared to the 1980s. Second, although the heterogeneity
in the effects of IT and CT across sectors is salient, especially in quantitative terms, there
is not a clear pattern of disproportionate effects in certain sectors. By contrast, I identify
a clear pattern of disproportionate effects across countries differing in the level of collective
bargaining as captured by union density. In particular, I find that the wage bill share differ-
ences that are generated by IT and CT intensities among worker types are smaller in countries
where union density is higher. This result empirically validates the crucial role of collective
bargaining –and more broadly, of labour market institutions– in the mitigation of inequalities
among different worker types.
The identified effects of IT and CT on the skill, age, and age-skill composition of labour
demand are novel and complement existing evidence on ICT being biased in favour of more
skilled workers, against workers in routine-intensive occupations, and against older workers.
By making the crucial distinction between IT and CT, not only do I identify distinct effects
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of each of the two types of technologies on different worker types, but I also identify dis-
tinct effects of IT and CT on each worker type. These findings can hardly be explained by
the traditional task-based approach and are, instead, rationalised by the theoretical frame-
work in Section 2 which is predicated upon knowledge-based hierarchy theories. Low-skilled
workers, who are at the bottom of the knowledge-based hierarchy, gain wage bill shares from
the adoption of IT by the representative firm as this type of technologies allows them to
acquire knowledge at a lower cost and subsequently, to become less dependent on their su-
periors, namely, the medium-skilled and high-skilled workers. The wage bill share losses of
the medium-skilled, who proxy for middle managers, from the adoption of IT suggest that
their losses from the lower dependence of the low-skilled on them are greater than their gains
from their lower dependence on their superiors, namely, the high-skilled workers who are at
the top the hierarchy. This also explains the wage bill share gains of the high-skilled. In
addition, the wage bill share gains of the medium-skilled and the wage bill share losses of the
low-skilled from the adoption of CT suggest that low-skilled workers become more dependent
on medium-skilled workers and that the gains of the medium-skilled from the greater depen-
dence of the low-skilled on them are greater than the losses that the medium-skilled incur due
to their greater dependence on their superiors, namely, the high-skilled.
The wage bill share gains of the oldest workers and the losses of the middle-aged from
the adoption of IT suggest that this type of technologies allow the oldest workers, who are
more knowledgeable and autonomous, to solve their existing problems more efficiently than
the middle-aged or to increase by more the range of problems they deal with. The wage bill
share gains of younger workers and the losses of the oldest from the adoption of CT suggest
that the knowledge advantage of the oldest workers becomes less important or the range of
their tasks narrows more than the range of tasks of younger workers.
Finally, the wage bill share changes due to the adoption of IT that I identify are explained
by the trade-off between the gains of a worker type from its lower dependence on superiors
and the losses from the lower dependence of subordinates on this worker type. Similarly, the
wage bill share changes due to the adoption of CT are explained by the trade-off between
the losses of a worker type from its greater dependence on superiors and the gains from the
greater dependence of subordinates on this worker type.
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6 Robustness checks
In this section, I discuss numerous checks for the robustness of the main results shown in
Tables 2 and 3. Although the first and second lags of explanatory variables that I use as
instruments can capture the potential sluggish response of wage bill shares to changes in IT
and CT intensities, I estimate the main specification on a sample with biannual frequency
covering the period 1982–2004. The results, shown in Panel A of Tables B4 and B5, bear a
very close resemblance to the main ones in terms of sign, size and precision.27 Relatedly, in
Panel B of Tables C1 and C2, I obtain very similar results to the main ones when I control for
a 5-year span at maximum in the sluggishness of wage bill share adjustments by estimating
the main specification using as instruments the first, second, and fifth lags of the instrumented
variables.
In the second group of robustness checks, I ensure that the main results are robust to the
use of alternative capital variables or to the benchmark variables being incorporated in the
main specification in logs. Panel B of Tables B4 and B5 confirms that the main results remain
largely unchanged when I normalise the real fixed non-ICT, IT and CT capital stocks by real
gross output. The results are also robust to estimations with capital variables being normalised
by the total hours worked by persons engaged or the total hours worked by employees (Tables
C3 and C4). As shown in Panel C of Tables B4 and B5, the main results remain largely
unchanged also when I construct capital intensities as the ratios of real gross fixed non-ICT,
IT and CT capital formations, rather than stocks, to real gross value added. Third, I use the
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHST) method in order to deal with the presence of
some very small values of IT and CT capital intensities in early years of the sample which
lead to extremely high values when in logs. I, then, incorporate in the main specification
the transformed capital variables in logs. Tables C5 and C6 reveal that the results of these
estimations are very similar to the main ones.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, country-year fixed effects capture wages under the assump-
tion that the wage-setting process takes place at the national level. In order to control for
the possibility that wages are determined at the industry level, I incorporate in the main
specification relative wages and replace the country-year fixed effects with year fixed effects.
For the construction of the relative wages, I first calculate the real hourly wage of a worker
27In tables that are available upon request, I show that the results remain largely unchanged also when I
re-estimate the main specification on a sample with biannual frequency covering the period 1983–2005.
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type as the ratio of her wage bill to her total hours of work, and then, I calculate the ratio
of her real hourly wage to the real hourly wage for the reference worker type. The reference
group comprises the low-skilled, the oldest, and the oldest low-skilled when I consider workers
differing in skill, in age, and in age-skill, respectively. Relative wages are treated as endoge-
nous and each of these is instrumented with its first and second lags. The results obtained
from these estimations are very similar to the main ones and are shown in the Tables C7 and
C8.
By adding to the specification with the relative wages the ratios of country-level exports
and country-level imports to GDP, I show that the main results are robust to country-level
trade openness (Tables C9 and C10). Data on the two variables capturing trade openness are
drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Using again the specification
with the relative wages, I also show that the main results are not spuriously driven by publicly-
funded labour market programmes aiming at the improvement of the labour market prospects
of workers (Tables C11 and C12). The variables that I incorporate in the specification are
the ratios of government expenditures on active and passive labour market programmes to
country-wide GDP.28 Data on these variables are drawn from the OECD. In the estimations
controlling for trade openness and for labour market programmes, the additional control
variables are treated as endogenous and are instrumented with their first and second lags.
As a final robustness check, in order to ensure that changes in IT and CT intensities
do not simply pick up labour productivity shocks affecting the wage bill shares of different
worker types, I estimate the benchmark specification with the log of industry-level aggregate
labour productivity incorporated. Data on this control variable are drawn from EU KLEMS.
Same as the rest of the explanatory variables, this control is treated as endogenous and is
instrumented with its first and second lags. As shown in Panel D of Tables B4 and B5, the
results remain largely unchanged.
7 Conclusion
This paper is the first to study the distinct effects of Information Technologies (IT) and Com-
munication Technologies (CT) on the skill, age, and age-skill composition of labour demand.
28Active measures comprise training, job rotation and job sharing, employment incentives, supported employ-
ment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, and start-up incentives. Passive measures comprise out-of-work
income maintenance and support and early retirement.
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The analysis is conducted on a sample comprising 10 developed countries, 30 industries that
cover the largest part of the economy, and the period 1982–2005.
When I study the effects of IT and CT on the skill composition and age composition of
labour demand, I find that IT intensity increases the relative demands for the high-skilled,
low-skilled and oldest workers, while it decreases the relative demands for the medium-skilled
and younger workers. CT intensity exerts opposite effects by decreasing the relative demands
for the low-skilled and the oldest workers, and increasing the relative demands for the medium-
skilled and the youngest. Studying the effects of IT and CT on the age-skill composition of
labour demand, I find that IT intensity increases the relative demands for the high-skilled and
low-skilled of all age profiles, while it decreases the relative demands for the medium-skilled
of all age profiles. CT intensity exerts mostly opposite effects by decreasing the relative
demands for older low-skilled workers and increasing the relative demands for the younger
more skilled. These findings can hardly be explained by the traditional task-based approach
that overlooks the organisational aspect of the adoption of IT and CT by firms. They are,
instead, rationalised by knowledge-based hierarchy theories, according to which, the adoption
of IT leads to the empowerment of agents at lower levels of the hierarchy, while the adoption
of CT leads to the empowerment of agents at higher levels of the hierarchy. Interestingly, I
also find that the aforementioned effects are in operation mostly from 1990 onwards, when IT
and CT advancements took place at an even higher rate compared to the 1980s. Although
a clear pattern of disproportionate effects in certain sectors is not identified, such a pattern
across countries does exist: the inequalities that are generated by IT and CT intensities among
worker types are smaller in countries where union density is higher.
My analysis in this paper would be nicely complemented by an analysis using a matched
employer-employee dataset that provides information on key labour variables such as the wage
bill shares of different types of workers and on firms’ investment in different types of IT and
CT. For instance, Bloom et al. (2014) observe two types of IT, Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) and Computer Assisted Design/Computer Assisted Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) that
are used by middle managers and production workers respectively, as well as one type of
CT, data network/intranet. However, the goal of their study is to identify the effects of
these variables on the organisational structure of firms, rather than on their labour force.
Information on other variables that can capture the organisational structure of firms in the
spirit of Caroli & Van Reenen (2001) would allow for the possible identification of separate
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effects on different worker types of variables capturing technological change and variables
capturing organisation change.
Identifying the effects of IT and CT on the relative demands for workers differing in age
and skill shows how these two types of technologies lead to inequalities among these worker
types, but remains silent about whether and how the terms and conditions of employment of
these worker types are impacted by these two types of technologies. An increase in own-wage
elasticities of demand for specific groups of the working-age population implies a worsening of
the terms and conditions of their employment (e.g. higher job insecurity and earnings volatil-
ity), while a decrease in their own-wage demand elasticities implies the opposite. Therefore,
another interesting complementary analysis would be the investigation of the individual effects
of IT and CT on the elasticities of demand for workers with different age and skill profiles.
What is more, the evidence on the mitigation of inequalities among worker types generated
by IT and CT in countries with higher union density calls for shedding more light on the role
of labour market institutions. For instance, are other labour market laws such as the minimum
wage, the cap on executive payments and bonuses, and the costly lay-offs effective ways of
reducing inequalities among worker types generated by the introduction of IT and CT? If yes,
to which extent does a reduction in inequalities occur? Also, is such a reduction achieved
at a cost, namely, an increase in unemployment or a lower potential for productivity gains
from the utilisation of new IT and CT? In the same vein, the evidence that I provide on
the opposite effects of IT and CT on the relative demand for each worker type call for an
in-depth investigation of the role of training and lifelong learning in helping each worker type
to maximise the gains from the utilisation of one of the two types of technologies, while at
the same time, minimise the loses from the utilisation of the other.
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Appendix
A Additional descriptive statistics
Table A1: Countries and industries
Panel A: Countries
No. Country Name No. Country Name
1 Australia 6 Japan
2 Austria 7 Netherlands
3 Denmark 8 Spain
4 Finland 9 United Kingdom
5 Italy 10 United States of America
Panel B: Industries
NACE Rev 1.1 Industry Name NACE Rev 1.1 Industry Name
AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
C Mining and Quarrying F Construction
15–16 Food products, Beverages and Tobacco 50 Wholesale and Retail; Motor Vehicles
17–19 Textiles, Textile Products, Leather and Footwear 51 Wholesale, expect Motor Vehicles
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 52 Retail, except Motor Vehicles
21–22 Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing H Hotels and Restaurants
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 60–63 Transportation and Storage
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 64 Post and Telecommunications
25 Rubber and Plastics Products J Financial Intermediation
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 70 Real Estate
27–28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 71–74 Other Business Activities
29 Machinery and Equipment, n.e.c. L Public Administration and Defence
30–33 Electrical and Optical Equipment M Education
34–35 Transport Equipment N Health and Social Work
36–37 Manufacturing n.e.c.; Recycling O Other Community, Social and Personal Services
Source: EU KLEMS.
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Table A2: IT and CT by country and by industry
Panel A: By country
Country
Mean level Mean level Mean % change
1982 2005 1982–2005
IT CT IT CT IT CT
Australia 0.002 0.042 0.325 0.048 20593.38 81.36
Austria 0.001 0.036 0.122 0.043 39696.13 201.85
Denmark 0.004 0.004 0.314 0.014 12578.57 377.77
Finland 0.001 0.007 0.052 0.092 4935.94 3473.14
Italy 0.001 0.037 0.097 0.060 13502.49 242.32
Japan 0.004 0.015 0.045 0.041 1874.63 666.65
Netherlands 0.002 0.030 0.198 0.040 28885.25 106.32
Spain 0.002 0.038 0.077 0.081 5351.97 308.72
United Kingdom 0.001 0.007 0.179 0.042 24977.10 2030.81
United States 0.002 0.028 0.137 0.066 16533.56 4327.87
Unweighted mean 0.002 0.024 0.155 0.053 16892.90 1181.68
Panel B: By industry
Industry
Mean level Mean level Mean % change
1982 2005 1982–2005
IT CT IT CT IT CT
15T16 0.002 0.010 0.129 0.027 9107.83 306.80
17T19 0.001 0.006 0.120 0.023 25796.47 315.09
20 0.001 0.016 0.082 0.021 16512.24 313.31
21T22 0.003 0.011 0.239 0.044 14489.53 424.23
23 0.005 0.033 1.562 0.094 28647.04 645.93
24 0.002 0.024 0.097 0.026 12849.27 94.01
25 0.001 0.008 0.082 0.018 9153.69 230.80
26 0.002 0.011 0.126 0.030 18344.21 258.38
27T28 0.002 0.013 0.082 0.022 9761.96 683.09
29 0.002 0.008 0.142 0.022 11884.69 252.25
30T33 0.007 0.039 0.141 0.055 6543.76 58.21
34T35 0.002 0.013 0.105 0.031 10729.51 331.80
36T37 0.001 0.010 0.127 0.024 22605.61 359.22
50 0.002 0.012 0.132 0.035 9784.66 425.11
51 0.003 0.014 0.188 0.036 6404.79 423.06
52 0.003 0.011 0.173 0.035 10057.89 441.51
60 0.002 0.104 0.149 0.227 13304.26 389.02
64 0.004 0.541 0.210 0.615 11629.55 307.82
70 0.000 0.002 0.051 0.007 21579.66 1421.78
71 0.008 0.010 0.388 0.081 9887.10 1366.50
ATB 0.001 0.012 0.036 0.010 12284.02 372.95
C 0.004 0.015 0.116 0.032 21379.34 150.61
E 0.003 0.044 0.154 0.070 7936.31 119.34
F 0.000 0.004 0.056 0.023 32222.00 9517.83
H 0.001 0.007 0.090 0.034 20450.69 3209.65
J 0.007 0.012 0.330 0.023 8282.35 213.53
L 0.003 0.013 0.251 0.061 26094.29 1086.31
M 0.002 0.003 0.172 0.020 56526.66 1308.19
N 0.001 0.005 0.121 0.017 15804.34 740.20
O 0.002 0.034 0.228 0.140 14101.55 866.80
Notes: IT: ratio of real IT capital stock to real gross value added; CT: ratio of real CT capital
stock to real gross value added. In Panel A, levels and percentage changes are averaged across
industries within each country using as weights each industry’s employment share in country-
wide employment in 1982. In Panel B, levels and percentage changes are averaged across
countries within each industry. No country weights are used.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU KLEMS.
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Table A3: Wage bill shares by skill
Panel A: By country
Country
Mean level Mean level Mean % change
1982 2005 1982–2005
HS MS LS HS MS LS HS MS LS
Australia 0.093 0.426 0.481 0.235 0.398 0.367 161.09 -6.47 -23.89
Austria 0.085 0.608 0.307 0.148 0.687 0.165 139.50 19.38 -45.68
Denmark 0.062 0.534 0.409 0.103 0.678 0.219 94.47 31.50 -47.87
Finland 0.271 0.301 0.428 0.419 0.414 0.168 64.09 37.65 -62.05
Italy 0.049 0.886 0.065 0.096 0.900 0.004 147.40 1.82 -89.62
Japan 0.195 0.509 0.297 0.320 0.598 0.082 75.40 20.05 -75.80
Netherlands 0.080 0.780 0.140 0.168 0.792 0.040 482.27 1.91 -69.06
Spain 0.130 0.109 0.761 0.262 0.310 0.428 346.87 288.30 -46.77
United Kingdom 0.105 0.555 0.340 0.259 0.657 0.085 240.00 20.46 -75.82
United States 0.301 0.561 0.138 0.428 0.510 0.062 54.57 -9.27 -59.30
Unweighted mean 0.137 0.527 0.337 0.244 0.594 0.162 180.57 40.53 -59.59
Panel B: By industry
Industry
Mean level Mean level Mean % change
1982 2005 1982–2005
HS MS LS HS MS LS HS MS LS
15T16 0.067 0.507 0.427 0.157 0.631 0.212 187.10 44.95 -55.27
17T19 0.056 0.484 0.464 0.145 0.630 0.225 209.86 68.66 -56.57
20 0.076 0.500 0.430 0.177 0.638 0.200 147.25 46.07 -57.64
21T22 0.104 0.544 0.352 0.207 0.634 0.159 154.31 32.60 -60.65
23 0.126 0.551 0.330 0.227 0.620 0.152 133.65 28.71 -56.55
24 0.135 0.518 0.347 0.272 0.577 0.150 140.74 27.26 -63.72
25 0.094 0.522 0.392 0.188 0.632 0.180 134.49 37.16 -59.23
26 0.080 0.504 0.416 0.179 0.628 0.193 138.50 40.80 -58.63
27T28 0.080 0.531 0.388 0.176 0.646 0.179 131.00 37.41 -58.65
29 0.093 0.585 0.322 0.213 0.646 0.141 143.31 24.89 -62.19
30T33 0.120 0.573 0.307 0.265 0.607 0.128 145.03 14.16 -64.03
34T35 0.109 0.572 0.328 0.218 0.634 0.148 158.73 26.97 -60.11
36T37 0.084 0.508 0.415 0.176 0.622 0.203 154.53 49.15 -57.48
50 0.073 0.593 0.341 0.138 0.684 0.178 389.41 34.21 -54.74
51 0.112 0.559 0.329 0.206 0.629 0.164 139.90 30.66 -58.70
52 0.086 0.576 0.338 0.165 0.657 0.178 119.10 32.64 -54.34
60T63 0.061 0.539 0.401 0.123 0.665 0.212 117.48 44.28 -54.17
64 0.080 0.599 0.325 0.247 0.607 0.146 559.44 5.21 -41.82
70 0.257 0.514 0.229 0.391 0.514 0.095 68.46 5.01 -59.20
71T74 0.288 0.503 0.209 0.482 0.429 0.089 96.83 -5.69 -61.96
ATB 0.064 0.411 0.524 0.139 0.582 0.279 669.77 98.75 -54.20
C 0.109 0.526 0.370 0.205 0.624 0.171 155.69 46.00 -60.75
E 0.118 0.598 0.284 0.232 0.656 0.112 126.78 22.43 -67.18
F 0.074 0.545 0.381 0.111 0.693 0.196 69.88 68.23 -54.28
H 0.062 0.535 0.402 0.138 0.651 0.211 227.69 76.00 -54.45
J 0.207 0.609 0.184 0.422 0.511 0.067 139.88 -16.98 -71.95
L 0.202 0.573 0.226 0.376 0.555 0.069 118.23 1.92 -72.38
M 0.481 0.396 0.124 0.622 0.335 0.044 44.61 -7.37 -69.43
N 0.259 0.540 0.201 0.398 0.532 0.070 93.31 16.98 -67.70
O 0.179 0.537 0.285 0.303 0.572 0.125 87.03 13.78 -61.02
Notes: HS: high-skilled; MS: medium-skilled; LS: low-skilled. In Panel A, levels and percentage changes are averaged
across industries within each country using as weights each industry’s employment share in country-wide employment in
1982. In Panel B, levels and percentage changes are averaged across countries within each industry. No country weights
are used.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU KLEMS.
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Table A4: Wage bill shares by age
Panel A: By country
Country
Mean level Mean level Mean % change
1982 2005 1982–2005
15–29 30–49 50+ 15–29 30–49 50+ 15–29 30–49 50+
Australia 0.310 0.463 0.226 0.212 0.510 0.278 -30.93 10.24 26.85
Austria 0.286 0.490 0.225 0.186 0.584 0.230 -33.67 19.86 9.02
Denmark 0.264 0.524 0.207 0.165 0.553 0.281 -38.43 6.89 38.71
Finland 0.255 0.564 0.181 0.137 0.543 0.321 -45.99 -3.18 78.61
Italy 0.289 0.632 0.078 0.238 0.709 0.053 -16.52 13.10 -31.09
Japan 0.210 0.570 0.220 0.155 0.508 0.337 -25.04 -10.37 57.41
Netherlands 0.265 0.531 0.204 0.159 0.570 0.270 -37.72 8.72 38.16
Spain 0.228 0.482 0.290 0.174 0.558 0.267 -21.93 17.24 -5.51
United Kingdom 0.329 0.511 0.160 0.185 0.562 0.253 -41.87 11.89 63.39
United States 0.387 0.446 0.167 0.242 0.560 0.197 -37.86 25.95 18.11
Unweighted mean 0.282 0.521 0.196 0.185 0.566 0.249 -32.99 10.03 29.36
Panel B: By industry
Industry
Mean level Mean level Mean % change
1982 2005 1982–2005
15–29 30–49 50+ 15–29 30–49 50+ 15–29 30–49 50+
15T16 0.283 0.519 0.197 0.185 0.579 0.236 -32.79 12.99 18.36
17T19 0.319 0.490 0.189 0.176 0.574 0.251 -44.98 18.78 26.50
20 0.284 0.510 0.206 0.177 0.564 0.258 -30.16 11.98 25.35
21T22 0.268 0.537 0.196 0.171 0.578 0.251 -32.54 9.54 26.66
23 0.260 0.548 0.192 0.137 0.618 0.246 -42.56 14.43 29.56
24 0.253 0.553 0.194 0.154 0.601 0.245 -35.34 10.65 27.52
25 0.274 0.544 0.182 0.180 0.575 0.245 -26.81 8.46 31.44
26 0.261 0.538 0.201 0.159 0.583 0.258 -35.23 9.81 25.81
27T28 0.277 0.532 0.191 0.172 0.577 0.251 -34.36 10.42 26.52
29 0.281 0.544 0.175 0.166 0.594 0.240 -39.16 10.27 32.56
30T33 0.284 0.552 0.164 0.176 0.606 0.219 -36.99 10.33 32.22
34T35 0.259 0.568 0.168 0.160 0.601 0.239 -35.24 6.76 41.90
36T37 0.302 0.515 0.182 0.195 0.572 0.233 -35.02 12.57 26.06
50 0.342 0.492 0.158 0.229 0.561 0.210 -30.09 16.43 38.35
51 0.292 0.528 0.180 0.213 0.568 0.219 -26.83 8.26 23.07
52 0.335 0.498 0.168 0.270 0.527 0.203 -19.17 6.77 21.76
60T63 0.237 0.552 0.211 0.157 0.595 0.248 -31.31 8.39 19.11
64 0.246 0.555 0.198 0.172 0.618 0.210 -26.10 12.54 8.28
70 0.266 0.537 0.196 0.195 0.547 0.258 -28.52 2.71 34.72
71T74 0.294 0.542 0.164 0.205 0.584 0.211 -30.35 8.62 31.54
ATB 0.251 0.467 0.282 0.171 0.513 0.316 -28.64 12.05 16.33
C 0.226 0.574 0.205 0.126 0.595 0.280 -39.58 4.97 30.07
E 0.199 0.567 0.234 0.118 0.599 0.283 -36.04 6.69 32.30
F 0.274 0.535 0.190 0.215 0.553 0.232 -19.92 4.46 19.78
H 0.349 0.485 0.166 0.288 0.523 0.189 -17.64 8.99 12.32
J 0.298 0.545 0.158 0.150 0.637 0.213 -49.63 19.06 34.15
L 0.265 0.524 0.211 0.143 0.586 0.272 -44.40 12.71 31.91
M 0.197 0.589 0.214 0.103 0.580 0.317 -46.27 0.37 55.18
N 0.323 0.512 0.165 0.152 0.586 0.262 -51.90 16.12 63.63
O 0.271 0.512 0.217 0.200 0.545 0.256 -26.11 7.22 18.43
Notes: HS: high-skilled; MS: medium-skilled; LS: low-skilled. In Panel A, levels and percentage changes are averaged
across industries within each country using as weights each industry’s employment share in country-wide employment in
1982. In Panel B, levels and percentage changes are averaged across countries within each industry. No country weights
are used.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU KLEMS.
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Table A5: Wage bill shares by age-skill in 1982
Panel A: By country
Country (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
Australia 0.026 0.116 0.169 0.048 0.214 0.201 0.019 0.096 0.111
Austria 0.011 0.196 0.079 0.041 0.304 0.145 0.033 0.108 0.083
Denmark 0.006 0.140 0.121 0.039 0.313 0.173 0.013 0.080 0.115
Finland 0.047 0.127 0.082 0.177 0.149 0.238 0.047 0.025 0.109
Italy 0.006 0.279 0.004 0.037 0.547 0.048 0.006 0.060 0.013
Japan 0.042 0.144 0.024 0.126 0.285 0.160 0.028 0.080 0.113
Netherlands 0.007 0.230 0.028 0.051 0.406 0.073 0.021 0.144 0.039
Spain 0.026 0.042 0.160 0.071 0.047 0.365 0.034 0.020 0.236
United Kingdom 0.019 0.201 0.109 0.069 0.270 0.171 0.016 0.084 0.059
United States 0.106 0.243 0.038 0.149 0.234 0.063 0.046 0.084 0.037
Unweighted mean 0.030 0.172 0.081 0.081 0.277 0.164 0.026 0.078 0.092
Panel B: By industry
Industry (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
15T16 0.016 0.159 0.109 0.039 0.268 0.212 0.012 0.080 0.105
17T19 0.012 0.167 0.140 0.030 0.243 0.217 0.011 0.074 0.107
20 0.014 0.164 0.107 0.042 0.262 0.206 0.014 0.074 0.117
21T22 0.022 0.157 0.089 0.062 0.302 0.173 0.021 0.085 0.090
23 0.023 0.140 0.081 0.077 0.325 0.163 0.025 0.086 0.086
24 0.024 0.142 0.087 0.085 0.298 0.170 0.025 0.079 0.090
25 0.018 0.155 0.101 0.054 0.293 0.197 0.018 0.074 0.095
26 0.015 0.149 0.097 0.049 0.279 0.209 0.016 0.076 0.109
27T28 0.014 0.164 0.099 0.050 0.290 0.192 0.016 0.077 0.097
29 0.019 0.187 0.074 0.058 0.316 0.170 0.015 0.082 0.078
30T33 0.027 0.185 0.072 0.076 0.312 0.164 0.017 0.076 0.072
34T35 0.021 0.170 0.067 0.062 0.322 0.184 0.017 0.080 0.077
36T37 0.017 0.164 0.121 0.047 0.266 0.202 0.014 0.078 0.093
50 0.016 0.233 0.103 0.039 0.291 0.162 0.012 0.070 0.076
51 0.026 0.176 0.089 0.067 0.302 0.159 0.019 0.081 0.080
52 0.022 0.211 0.102 0.050 0.290 0.158 0.014 0.076 0.078
60T63 0.015 0.147 0.075 0.035 0.301 0.216 0.011 0.091 0.109
64 0.023 0.161 0.057 0.045 0.341 0.173 0.011 0.097 0.095
70 0.050 0.156 0.060 0.157 0.277 0.103 0.050 0.081 0.066
71T74 0.065 0.169 0.060 0.172 0.270 0.100 0.052 0.063 0.049
ATB 0.015 0.133 0.104 0.032 0.200 0.235 0.018 0.079 0.186
C 0.022 0.141 0.063 0.063 0.302 0.209 0.020 0.083 0.099
E 0.022 0.136 0.041 0.071 0.354 0.143 0.025 0.108 0.101
F 0.015 0.172 0.087 0.047 0.291 0.197 0.012 0.082 0.097
H 0.018 0.201 0.130 0.035 0.265 0.185 0.010 0.070 0.087
J 0.048 0.203 0.046 0.126 0.324 0.094 0.033 0.082 0.043
L 0.038 0.178 0.049 0.119 0.302 0.104 0.045 0.093 0.073
M 0.088 0.085 0.024 0.291 0.238 0.059 0.101 0.073 0.041
N 0.058 0.217 0.047 0.148 0.263 0.102 0.054 0.060 0.052
O 0.032 0.170 0.069 0.105 0.275 0.131 0.041 0.092 0.084
Notes: HS: high-skilled; MS: medium-skilled; LS: low-skilled. In Panel A, the wage bill shares are averaged across industries within each country using as weights each industry’s
employment share in country-wide employment in 1982. In Panel B, the wage bill shares are averaged across countries within each industry. No country weights are used.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU KLEMS.
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Table A6: Wage bill shares by age-skill in 2005
Panel A: By country
Country (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
Australia 0.044 0.077 0.091 0.129 0.211 0.169 0.062 0.110 0.107
Austria 0.014 0.141 0.031 0.093 0.407 0.084 0.040 0.139 0.051
Denmark 0.007 0.105 0.053 0.067 0.385 0.102 0.029 0.188 0.064
Finland 0.033 0.085 0.020 0.249 0.226 0.067 0.137 0.103 0.081
Italy 0.009 0.228 0.000 0.081 0.626 0.002 0.006 0.045 0.002
Japan 0.047 0.104 0.004 0.189 0.300 0.019 0.084 0.194 0.059
Netherlands 0.018 0.136 0.005 0.103 0.449 0.019 0.047 0.207 0.016
Spain 0.036 0.066 0.073 0.162 0.188 0.208 0.064 0.056 0.147
United Kingdom 0.041 0.135 0.009 0.162 0.362 0.037 0.056 0.160 0.038
United States 0.083 0.138 0.021 0.254 0.277 0.029 0.090 0.095 0.012
Unweighted mean 0.033 0.121 0.031 0.149 0.343 0.073 0.062 0.130 0.058
Panel B: By industry
Industry (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
15T16 0.023 0.124 0.037 0.102 0.375 0.102 0.032 0.131 0.072
17T19 0.020 0.119 0.036 0.093 0.372 0.108 0.032 0.138 0.081
20 0.019 0.122 0.036 0.101 0.372 0.092 0.047 0.145 0.072
21T22 0.028 0.115 0.028 0.129 0.375 0.074 0.050 0.144 0.057
23 0.026 0.085 0.027 0.149 0.396 0.072 0.052 0.139 0.054
24 0.035 0.093 0.026 0.175 0.354 0.071 0.062 0.130 0.053
25 0.023 0.125 0.032 0.117 0.372 0.086 0.048 0.135 0.062
26 0.021 0.106 0.033 0.112 0.381 0.090 0.046 0.142 0.071
27T28 0.021 0.119 0.032 0.109 0.384 0.084 0.045 0.142 0.063
29 0.028 0.113 0.024 0.138 0.391 0.065 0.047 0.141 0.052
30T33 0.038 0.115 0.022 0.173 0.368 0.064 0.054 0.124 0.041
34T35 0.029 0.105 0.025 0.141 0.390 0.070 0.047 0.139 0.053
36T37 0.024 0.131 0.040 0.113 0.360 0.098 0.038 0.130 0.064
50 0.022 0.162 0.045 0.087 0.396 0.079 0.029 0.126 0.055
51 0.031 0.145 0.037 0.128 0.363 0.076 0.047 0.121 0.052
52 0.031 0.189 0.050 0.100 0.351 0.075 0.035 0.117 0.052
60T63 0.017 0.106 0.034 0.079 0.413 0.103 0.027 0.146 0.075
64 0.042 0.101 0.029 0.171 0.376 0.071 0.034 0.130 0.046
70 0.052 0.127 0.016 0.236 0.265 0.046 0.103 0.121 0.033
71T74 0.090 0.098 0.018 0.298 0.243 0.044 0.094 0.089 0.028
ATB 0.014 0.113 0.044 0.078 0.322 0.112 0.047 0.146 0.123
C 0.019 0.086 0.021 0.125 0.385 0.085 0.061 0.153 0.066
E 0.025 0.078 0.014 0.146 0.403 0.050 0.061 0.174 0.047
F 0.014 0.153 0.048 0.067 0.394 0.092 0.030 0.145 0.057
H 0.028 0.200 0.061 0.085 0.345 0.093 0.026 0.106 0.057
J 0.064 0.077 0.009 0.281 0.326 0.030 0.077 0.109 0.028
L 0.043 0.090 0.010 0.223 0.333 0.029 0.110 0.132 0.030
M 0.059 0.038 0.006 0.373 0.187 0.020 0.190 0.110 0.018
N 0.046 0.096 0.010 0.245 0.310 0.032 0.108 0.127 0.028
O 0.043 0.131 0.026 0.173 0.311 0.061 0.087 0.130 0.039
Notes: HS: high-skilled; MS: medium-skilled; LS: low-skilled. In Panel A, the wage bill shares are averaged across industries within each country using as weights each industry’s
employment share in country-wide employment in 1982. In Panel B, the wage bill shares are averaged across countries within each industry. No country weights are used.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU KLEMS.
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Table A7: Percentage change in wage bill shares by age-skill over 1982–2005
Panel A: By country
Country (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
Australia 105.44 -32.82 -45.46 177.97 -0.26 -15.22 230.13 15.94 3.12
Austria 534.69 -23.86 -56.96 336.83 44.06 -39.02 57.89 36.08 -35.93
Denmark 66.97 -23.93 -57.69 125.11 32.61 -42.12 126.85 154.63 -44.17
Finland -26.52 -33.42 -76.81 53.64 56.97 -73.01 207.16 332.48 -26.86
Italy 40.28 -16.65 -73.48 194.07 15.44 -93.18 3.01 -23.86 -81.33
Japan 22.54 -25.24 -82.41 60.35 6.83 -89.64 268.91 159.63 -53.95
Netherlands 1284.39 -37.50 -82.11 546.41 12.50 -71.26 329.66 54.67 -52.45
Spain 198.17 92.62 -55.28 512.93 540.38 -45.16 297.07 294.10 -40.08
United Kingdom 254.56 -30.61 -90.25 231.38 38.35 -78.61 365.35 104.54 -36.30
United States -17.15 -44.15 -51.06 92.52 18.10 -57.75 117.38 13.64 -69.52
Unweighted mean 246.34 -17.56 -67.15 233.12 76.50 -60.50 200.34 114.18 -43.75
Panel B: By industry
Industry (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
15T16 204.32 -16.06 -67.00 244.32 82.43 -54.89 166.48 103.51 -38.55
17T19 228.59 -16.19 -74.71 317.84 110.08 -53.73 220.67 162.63 -32.64
20 108.41 -13.97 -65.94 173.44 59.95 -57.89 233.30 145.41 -42.32
21T22 155.58 -18.31 -69.70 183.05 44.53 -61.72 156.21 114.25 -43.52
23 121.87 -25.67 -57.44 158.84 45.05 -58.83 154.41 114.47 -38.97
24 131.02 -26.72 -71.19 161.46 40.56 -63.99 157.87 115.50 -49.04
25 105.15 -14.54 -67.54 184.38 49.14 -59.20 191.24 133.73 -42.20
26 100.24 -19.64 -67.37 163.14 54.25 -60.55 166.16 138.47 -41.49
27T28 106.92 -19.59 -67.07 156.14 50.87 -58.60 158.62 135.64 -42.31
29 98.08 -22.18 -74.87 162.38 34.27 -63.36 202.91 116.14 -44.30
30T33 93.40 -29.96 -73.54 151.92 26.55 -63.29 229.72 98.89 -49.10
34T35 108.62 -26.22 -70.07 169.92 37.18 -62.31 221.28 142.17 -38.71
36T37 175.43 -8.15 -69.20 204.17 86.03 -53.96 215.12 114.96 -38.66
50 200.95 -12.66 -65.45 459.98 62.92 -54.58 232.53 107.99 -33.74
51 168.06 -10.22 -67.14 151.94 50.32 -58.08 165.27 72.45 -43.27
52 164.09 -1.93 -59.91 123.81 51.28 -56.36 171.01 79.18 -38.59
60T63 226.00 -20.58 -60.76 140.80 75.13 -58.02 142.57 103.92 -35.40
64 4784.34 -33.29 23.35 603.24 20.73 -48.35 318.66 52.57 -36.54
70 41.16 -26.27 -22.77 75.77 7.51 -60.01 122.91 72.05 -40.53
71T74 115.95 -38.76 -71.66 98.68 4.93 -60.48 105.19 65.33 -45.47
ATB 1036.25 2.28 -64.33 942.58 190.78 -55.49 533.21 176.18 -40.53
C 60.72 -18.43 -73.98 135.38 68.67 -64.09 364.51 158.21 -42.03
E 72.03 -37.31 -68.28 158.92 38.21 -70.05 179.57 113.05 -55.84
F 63.58 12.99 -56.68 79.48 98.36 -57.07 118.32 176.91 -40.32
H 230.44 27.42 -62.01 277.51 144.39 -54.19 298.65 103.94 -39.85
J 128.44 -59.33 -76.29 172.80 -3.62 -73.11 118.19 46.46 -46.60
L 63.03 -48.62 -77.30 142.54 22.29 -75.44 151.95 52.82 -59.30
M -16.32 -49.33 -74.11 41.47 0.50 -71.62 127.19 56.70 -60.95
N 16.10 -49.89 -77.04 102.79 59.95 -71.14 151.45 135.07 -46.20
O 74.74 -20.89 -68.98 77.43 28.43 -56.26 142.90 57.15 -56.15
Notes: HS: high-skilled; MS: medium-skilled; LS: low-skilled. In Panel A, the percentage changes of wage bill shares are averaged across industries within each country using as
weights each industry’s employment share in country-wide employment in 1982. In Panel B, the percentage changes of wage bill shares are averaged across countries within each
industry. No country weights are used.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU KLEMS.
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B Additional empirical results
Table B1: Contribution of changes in IT and CT to changes in wage bill shares by skill and
by age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
IT 0.093*** -0.18*** 0.091*** -0.036*** -0.021** 0.057***
CT 0.019 0.069*** -0.088*** 0.095*** -0.010 -0.085***
F-test H0: βIT = βCT 0.00123 5.66e-19 1.68e-13 2.68e-10 0.638 2.20e-18
(P-value)
St. deviation of IT 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082
St. deviation of CT 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314
Magnitude of IT effect 0.01 -0.0195 0.0098 -0.0039 -0.0023 0.0062
Magnitude of CT effect N/A 0.0022 -0.0028 0.0029 N/A -0.0027
Net effect N/A (-) (+) (+) N/A (-)
Notes: The first two rows show the coefficient estimates of IT and CT of Table 2. The third row shows the p-values of
the F-tests for the statistical difference between the coefficient estimates of IT and CT. The fourth and fifth rows show
the standard deviation of IT and CT, respectively, on the estimating sample. The magnitude of the IT and CT effects in
the sixth and seventh row are calculated as the product of the standard deviation of IT and CT, respectively, with the
corresponding coefficient estimate. The net effect in the last row is the outcome of the comparison of the magnitudes of
the effects of IT and CT.
Table B2: IT, CT and skill groups by age and age groups by skill
Panel A: Skill composition of labour demand by age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh
15–29 30–49 50+
(15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y 0.029*** -0.079*** 0.050*** 0.027*** -0.079*** 0.053*** 0.030*** -0.064*** 0.033***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
K -0.0010 -0.0079*** 0.0089*** 0.00027 -0.0062** 0.0059** 0.0035* -0.018*** 0.014***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
IT 0.17*** -0.22*** 0.053*** 0.080*** -0.19*** 0.11*** 0.027*** -0.14*** 0.11***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.010] [0.01] [0.01]
CT 0.011 -0.026 0.015 0.031 0.055** -0.086*** 0.052*** 0.099*** -0.15***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Obs 7053 7053 7053
R2 0.566 0.406 0.701 0.595 0.540 0.801 0.589 0.658 0.834
Hansen J statistic 2192.9 1622.6 2429.9
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: Age composition of labour demand by skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh
HS MS LS
(15–29,HS) (30–49,HS) (50+,HS) (15–29,MS) (30–49,MS) (50+,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,LS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0022 -0.0012 0.0034 0.012** 0.0068 -0.019*** 0.018*** 0.0015 -0.019***
[0.005] [0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
K -0.0040** 0.0045 -0.00050 0.0023 0.0046** -0.0068*** -0.00084 0.0027 -0.0019
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
IT 0.011 -0.037** 0.026* -0.028*** -0.036*** 0.064*** 0.028*** -0.064*** 0.036***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.007] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
CT 0.091*** -0.10*** 0.011 0.092*** -0.034 -0.058*** 0.10*** 0.039 -0.14***
[0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Obs 7053 7053 7053
R2 0.405 0.300 0.373 0.753 0.612 0.773 0.528 0.722 0.796
Hansen J statistic 900.9 932.3 891.1
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns (1)–(3), (4)–(6), and (7)–(9) of both panels. Country-industry
and country-year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote
significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table B3: Contribution of changes in IT and CT to changes in wage bill shares by age-skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
IT 0.014*** -0.059*** 0.0093** 0.053*** -0.12*** 0.042*** 0.026*** -0.0078* 0.039***
CT 0.034*** 0.027* 0.034*** -0.0029 0.051*** -0.059*** -0.012 -0.0096 -0.063***
F-test H0: βIT = βCT 0.00199 0.00000471 0.0230 0.00218 9.62e-15 6.65e-09 0.0000296 0.872 5.06e-32
(P-value)
St. deviation of IT 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082 0.1082
St. deviation of CT 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314
Magnitude of IT effect 0.0015 -0.0029 0.001 0.0057 -0.013 0.0045 0.0028 -0.008 0.0042
Magnitude of CT effect 0.0011 0.00085 0.001 N/A 0.0016 -0.0019 N/A N/A -0.002
Net effect (+) (-) (+) N/A (-) (+) N/A N/A (+)
Notes: The first two rows show the coefficient estimates of IT and CT of Table 3. The third row shows the p-values of the F-tests for the statistical difference between the coefficient
estimates of IT and CT. The fourth and fifth rows show the standard deviation of IT and CT, respectively, on the estimating sample. The magnitude of the IT and CT effects in the
sixth and seventh row are calculated as the product of the standard deviation of IT and CT, respectively, with the corresponding coefficient estimate. The net effect in the last row is the
outcome of the comparison of the magnitudes of the effects of IT and CT.
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Table B4: IT, CT and worker types by skill and by age (robustness checks)
Panel A: Biannual frequency (1982–2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.039*** -0.12*** 0.077*** -0.0095 0.023** -0.013**
[0.009] [0.01] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.006]
K 0.0043 -0.019*** 0.014*** -0.0042 0.0077* -0.0035
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003]
IT 0.092*** -0.18*** 0.083*** -0.034** -0.020 0.055***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
CT 0.028 0.12*** -0.14*** 0.15*** -0.037 -0.11***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02]
Obs 3525 3525
R2 0.646 0.512 0.814 0.680 0.542 0.702
Hansen J statistic 334.2 361.3
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: IT and CT capital stocks normalised by real gross output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.011*** -0.062*** 0.051*** 0.020*** 0.0063 -0.026***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
K -0.0073** 0.0056 0.0017 -0.0067** 0.018*** -0.011***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
IT Y 0.21*** -0.35*** 0.13*** -0.055*** -0.11*** 0.16***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
CT Y -0.023 0.078** -0.055** 0.035 0.0019 -0.037**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.650 0.542 0.824 0.690 0.537 0.716
Hansen J statistic 682.4 645.7
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel C: Gross fixed non-ICT, IT and CT capital formations normalised by real gross value added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.029*** -0.069*** 0.040*** 0.013*** 0.0024 -0.015***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002]
K 0.0023 -0.071*** 0.068*** 0.054*** -0.024* -0.029***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.010]
IT2 0.23*** -0.44*** 0.21*** -0.076*** -0.064*** 0.14***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
CT2 -0.021 0.28*** -0.26*** 0.22*** -0.042 -0.18***
[0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.05]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.647 0.524 0.821 0.685 0.532 0.711
Hansen J statistic 1866.4 890.7
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel D: Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.034*** -0.099*** 0.066*** 0.011** -0.0040 -0.0069**
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003]
K 0.0011 -0.0030 0.0019 -0.0021 0.0074*** -0.0052***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
IT 0.090*** -0.16*** 0.068*** -0.044*** -0.0026 0.046***
[0.009] [0.01] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007]
CT 0.017 0.087*** -0.10*** 0.093*** -0.0016 -0.091***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
LPROD -0.0058 0.055*** -0.049*** -0.016*** 0.038*** -0.022***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.648 0.553 0.829 0.687 0.542 0.716
Hansen J statistic 1473.9 790.5
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in all panels. Country-
industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s
employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the
description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table B5: IT, CT and worker types by age-skill (robustness checks)
Panel A: Biannual frequency (1982–2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0063** -0.034*** 0.030*** 0.033*** -0.048*** 0.037*** 0.012*** -0.035*** 0.0094***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.004] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
K -0.0049*** -0.0082** 0.0089*** 0.0059 -0.0024 0.0042 0.0034* -0.0080*** 0.0011
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
IT 0.019*** -0.055*** 0.0020 0.052*** -0.11*** 0.037*** 0.021*** -0.011 0.044***
[0.005] [0.01] [0.008] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006]
CT 0.049*** 0.057** 0.042** -0.0015 0.069** -0.10*** -0.019 -0.010 -0.081***
[0.010] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
Obs 3525
R2 0.299 0.515 0.677 0.540 0.573 0.722 0.620 0.791 0.644
Hansen J statistic 1571.8
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: IT and CT capital stocks normalised by real gross output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.00020 -0.0051 0.025*** 0.013*** -0.024*** 0.016*** -0.0019 -0.033*** 0.0090***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.010*** -0.0018 0.0053*** 0.0031 0.019*** -0.0046* -0.00028 -0.012*** 0.0011
[0.0010] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
IT Y 0.014*** -0.10*** 0.031*** 0.10*** -0.27*** 0.059*** 0.096*** 0.025*** 0.043***
[0.004] [0.01] [0.007] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
CT Y 0.011 -0.0029 0.027** -0.020 0.078*** -0.057*** -0.014 0.0025 -0.025**
[0.007] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.010]
Obs 7053
R2 0.330 0.544 0.683 0.537 0.584 0.734 0.640 0.798 0.635
Hansen J statistic 2909.9
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel C: Gross fixed non-ICT, IT and CT capital formations normalised by real gross value added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y 0.0028*** -0.0094*** 0.019*** 0.022*** -0.035*** 0.015*** 0.0045*** -0.025*** 0.0053***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
K -0.0026 0.0068 0.049*** -0.0088 -0.029** 0.014 0.014*** -0.048*** 0.0051
[0.004] [0.01] [0.006] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
IT2 0.026*** -0.14*** 0.038*** 0.14*** -0.29*** 0.085*** 0.064*** -0.012 0.088***
[0.006] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.008] [0.010] [0.008]
CT2 0.089*** 0.052 0.080** -0.075 0.22*** -0.19*** -0.035 0.0062 -0.15***
[0.02] [0.06] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Obs 7053
R2 0.283 0.542 0.676 0.541 0.559 0.732 0.629 0.795 0.637
Hansen J statistic 4581.6
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel D: Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0022 -0.017*** 0.030*** 0.026*** -0.054*** 0.024*** 0.0096*** -0.029*** 0.012***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.0036*** -0.0034** 0.0049*** 0.0045*** 0.0056*** -0.0028* 0.00022 -0.0053*** -0.00021
[0.0005] [0.002] [0.0009] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007]
IT 0.013*** -0.059*** 0.0018 0.056*** -0.091*** 0.032*** 0.020*** -0.0078* 0.034***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
CT 0.034*** 0.029* 0.029*** -0.0022 0.067*** -0.067*** -0.015** -0.0095 -0.067***
[0.005] [0.02] [0.009] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
LPROD -0.00083 0.00099 -0.016*** 0.0059** 0.054*** -0.021*** -0.011*** 0.00037 -0.012***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Obs 7053
R2 0.300 0.543 0.686 0.540 0.593 0.736 0.637 0.797 0.646
Hansen J statistic 4986.4
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in all panels. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in
all equations. All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and
10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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C Additional robustness checks
Table C1: IT, CT and worker types by skill and by age (other alternative IV)
Panel A: Only first lag of instrumented variables as IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.032*** -0.076*** 0.043*** 0.0060 0.0085* -0.015***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003]
K 0.0025 -0.0071*** 0.0045** -0.00037 0.0035* -0.0032**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
IT 0.091*** -0.18*** 0.093*** -0.036*** -0.021** 0.057***
[0.009] [0.01] [0.01] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007]
CT 0.019 0.068*** -0.087*** 0.094*** -0.0081 -0.086***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.647 0.525 0.820 0.685 0.530 0.712
Hansen J statistic 1433.9 744.1
Instruments First lag of instrumented variables
Panel B: First, second and fifth lag of instrumented variables as IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.031*** -0.081*** 0.050*** 0.0043 0.013*** -0.017***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
K 0.00081 -0.011*** 0.0098*** -0.0016 0.0045** -0.0029**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
IT 0.092*** -0.18*** 0.086*** -0.033*** -0.025*** 0.059***
[0.009] [0.01] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007]
CT 0.017 0.070*** -0.086*** 0.094*** -0.014 -0.081***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.647 0.523 0.820 0.685 0.529 0.712
Hansen J statistic 3160.1 1004.5
Instruments First, second, fifth lag of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns
(1)–(3) and columns (4)–(6) of both panels. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations.
All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks
denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table C2: IT, CT and worker types by age-skill (other alternative IV)
Panel A: Only first lag of instrumented variables as IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0028** -0.016*** 0.024*** 0.029*** -0.033*** 0.012*** 0.0059*** -0.027*** 0.0067***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.0036*** -0.0035** 0.0067*** 0.0047*** 0.0013 -0.0025* 0.0014* -0.0049*** 0.00027
[0.0005] [0.002] [0.0009] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0007]
IT 0.014*** -0.059*** 0.0084* 0.052*** -0.12*** 0.045*** 0.025*** -0.0081* 0.040***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
CT 0.034*** 0.026* 0.034*** -0.0027 0.052*** -0.058*** -0.012 -0.011 -0.063***
[0.005] [0.02] [0.009] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
Obs 7053
R2 0.300 0.543 0.676 0.540 0.556 0.731 0.628 0.797 0.640
Hansen J statistic 4381.2
Instruments First lag of instrumented variables
Panel B: First, second and fifth lag of instrumented variables as IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0025** -0.016*** 0.023*** 0.028*** -0.034*** 0.019*** 0.0053*** -0.030*** 0.0080***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.0039*** -0.0040*** 0.0063*** 0.0033** -0.00071 0.0020 0.0015** -0.0059*** 0.0016**
[0.0005] [0.001] [0.0008] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0007]
IT 0.014*** -0.058*** 0.010** 0.053*** -0.12*** 0.038*** 0.026*** -0.0052 0.038***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.004] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
CT 0.033*** 0.027* 0.034*** -0.0050 0.050*** -0.059*** -0.011 -0.0081 -0.061***
[0.005] [0.02] [0.009] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
Obs 7053
R2 0.300 0.543 0.677 0.541 0.557 0.731 0.629 0.796 0.641
Hansen J statistic 6987.4
Instruments First, second, fifth lag of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets of both panels. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in
all equations. All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and
10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table C3: IT, CT and worker types by skill and by age (alternative normalisations of capital
stocks)
Panel A: Real non-ICT, IT and CT capital stocks normalised by hours worked by persons engaged
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.026*** -0.066*** 0.040*** 0.0070** 0.00057 -0.0076***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
K -0.00000021 -0.0000015 0.0000017 0.0000019 -0.0000026 0.00000064
[0.000004] [0.000006] [0.000005] [0.000004] [0.000004] [0.000003]
IT H1 0.0018*** -0.0029*** 0.0011*** -0.0010*** 0.00052*** 0.00050***
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001]
CT H1 0.00040*** 0.00062*** -0.0010*** 0.00072*** 0.00014 -0.00086***
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.00010]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.648 0.514 0.818 0.687 0.531 0.711
Hansen J statistic 1429.3 856.2
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: Real non-ICT, IT and CT capital stocks normalised by hours worked by employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.026*** -0.066*** 0.040*** 0.0073** 0.00015 -0.0075***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
K -0.0000045 0.000012*** -0.0000074** 0.0000021 -0.00000028 -0.0000018
[0.000003] [0.000003] [0.000003] [0.000002] [0.000003] [0.000002]
IT H2 0.0016*** -0.0026*** 0.0010*** -0.00095*** 0.00061*** 0.00034***
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001]
CT H2 0.00040*** 0.00057*** -0.00097*** 0.00068*** 0.000094 -0.00078***
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.00009]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.648 0.513 0.818 0.687 0.532 0.710
Hansen J statistic 1356.1 839.0
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns (1)–(3) and columns
(4)–(6) of both panels. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations are weighted by the share
of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For
the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table C4: IT, CT and worker types by age-skill (alternative normalisations of capital stocks)
Panel A: Real non-ICT, IT and CT capital stocks normalised by hours worked by persons engaged
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y 0.0017* -0.0099*** 0.015*** 0.019*** -0.035*** 0.017*** 0.0053*** -0.021*** 0.0082***
[0.0010] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
K -0.0000041*** 0.0000033 0.0000027 -0.0000013 -0.0000031 0.0000018 0.0000052*** -0.0000016 -0.0000029*
[0.000001] [0.000004] [0.000002] [0.000004] [0.000004] [0.000003] [0.000002] [0.000002] [0.000002]
IT H1 0.000100** -0.0013*** 0.00020** 0.0015*** -0.0014*** 0.00043*** 0.00019*** -0.00019** 0.00050***
[0.00005] [0.0001] [0.00008] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.00007] [0.00008] [0.00007]
CT H1 0.00031*** 0.00032*** 0.000091 0.00029*** 0.00028** -0.00043*** -0.00020*** 0.000024 -0.00068***
[0.00004] [0.0001] [0.00007] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.00005] [0.00006] [0.00005]
Obs 7053
R2 0.288 0.545 0.670 0.548 0.546 0.731 0.625 0.794 0.640
Hansen J statistic 3744.3
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Panel B: Real non-ICT, IT and CT capital stocks normalised by hours worked by employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y 0.0015 -0.0096*** 0.015*** 0.019*** -0.035*** 0.016*** 0.0054*** -0.021*** 0.0080***
[0.0010] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
K -0.0000031*** 0.0000052** 0.000000036 -0.0000019 0.0000062** -0.0000045** 0.00000053 0.00000053 -0.0000029***
[0.0000008] [0.000002] [0.000001] [0.000002] [0.000003] [0.000002] [0.000001] [0.000001] [0.000001]
IT H2 0.000099** -0.0012*** 0.00012 0.0014*** -0.0012*** 0.00045*** 0.00013* -0.00024*** 0.00045***
[0.00005] [0.0001] [0.00008] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.00006] [0.00008] [0.00006]
CT H2 0.00030*** 0.00029*** 0.00010 0.00029*** 0.00024* -0.00043*** -0.00019*** 0.000040 -0.00063***
[0.00004] [0.0001] [0.00006] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.00005] [0.00006] [0.00005]
Obs 7053
R2 0.288 0.544 0.670 0.547 0.546 0.731 0.625 0.794 0.639
Hansen J statistic 3706.0
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets of both panels. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations. All
equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of the
variables, see Table C13.
Table C5: IT, CT and worker types by skill and by age (IHST)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln Y 0.039*** -0.098*** 0.059*** -0.00015 0.020*** -0.020***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004]
ln K 0.022*** -0.066*** 0.044*** -0.014** 0.030*** -0.016***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.005]
ln IT 0.093*** -0.18*** 0.087*** -0.032*** -0.037*** 0.070***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.009] [0.01] [0.007]
ln CT 0.0084 0.092*** -0.10*** 0.11*** -0.018 -0.088***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.647 0.533 0.823 0.685 0.529 0.712
Hansen J statistic 622.6 694.5
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns
(1)–(3) and columns (4)–(6). Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations
are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote
significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table C6: IT, CT and worker types by age-skill (IHST)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln Y -0.0022 -0.024*** 0.026*** 0.034*** -0.036*** 0.022*** 0.0074*** -0.039*** 0.011***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
ln K -0.0094*** -0.026*** 0.022*** 0.023*** -0.0042 0.011* 0.0083*** -0.036*** 0.011***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
ln IT 0.014*** -0.056*** 0.0096** 0.052*** -0.13*** 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.0033 0.040***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.010] [0.008] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
ln CT 0.036*** 0.035** 0.037*** -0.014 0.063*** -0.067*** -0.013* -0.0048 -0.070***
[0.006] [0.02] [0.010] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.008] [0.010] [0.008]
Obs 7053
R2 0.288 0.542 0.675 0.541 0.558 0.732 0.629 0.802 0.647
Hansen J statistic 2839.8
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets. Country-industry and country-year fixed effects included in all equations.
All equations are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For
the description of the variables, see Table C13.
Table C7: IT, CT and worker types by skill and by age (relative wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln WHS 0.10*** -0.035*** -0.070***
[0.007] [0.009] [0.009]
ln WMS -0.13*** -0.015 0.15***
[0.008] [0.01] [0.01]
ln WLS 0.029*** 0.050*** -0.079***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
ln W29 0.061*** -0.051*** -0.011
[0.007] [0.008] [0.007]
ln W49 0.012* 0.073*** -0.085***
[0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
ln W50 -0.073*** -0.022*** 0.095***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
ln Y 0.0044 -0.046*** 0.042*** 0.016*** -0.027*** 0.012***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
K 0.0012 0.0031 -0.0043** 0.0061*** -0.0089*** 0.0028**
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
IT 0.050*** -0.18*** 0.13*** -0.070*** 0.013 0.057***
[0.008] [0.01] [0.01] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
CT 0.077*** 0.067** -0.14*** 0.098*** -0.044** -0.054***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.582 0.262 0.657 0.592 0.228 0.414
Own-wage elasticity -0.249 -0.444 -1.098 -0.502 -0.302 -0.327
Hansen J statistic 765.8 504.1
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns (1)–(3)
and columns (4)–(6). Country-industry and year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations are weighted by the
share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5%
(**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table C8: IT, CT and worker types by age-skill (relative wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln W29,HS 0.0052** -0.020*** 0.025*** 0.00089 -0.032*** -0.018*** 0.040*** -0.025*** 0.025***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
ln W29,MS 0.014*** -0.015* 0.0020 0.072*** -0.11*** 0.018** -0.031*** 0.029*** 0.017***
[0.003] [0.009] [0.005] [0.008] [0.01] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
ln W29,LS -0.0068*** 0.027*** 0.027*** -0.017*** 0.022*** 0.030*** -0.017*** -0.049*** -0.017***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
ln W49,HS 0.017*** 0.015* -0.027*** 0.11*** -0.079*** -0.020** -0.0045 0.012* -0.022***
[0.003] [0.009] [0.005] [0.008] [0.01] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
ln W49,MS -0.038*** 0.024** 0.039*** -0.19*** 0.23*** -0.0016 -0.028*** -0.048*** 0.018***
[0.003] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.01] [0.01] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005]
ln W49,LS 0.0037* -0.049*** -0.030*** -0.0065 0.0084 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.041*** -0.013***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
ln W50,HS -0.00070 -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.0022 0.096*** -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.022***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
ln W50,MS 0.0085*** -0.058*** -0.0025 0.033*** -0.13*** 0.11*** 0.027*** 0.023*** -0.0053
[0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.007] [0.010] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
ln W50,LS -0.0030 0.090*** -0.022*** 0.0017 -0.0029 -0.11*** 0.0018 0.029*** 0.020***
[0.002] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
ln Y -0.0027** -0.014*** 0.030*** 0.0019 -0.036*** 0.0043 0.0019 0.011*** 0.0045***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.0023*** -0.0015 0.0082*** 0.0028** -0.0032** -0.0096*** 0.0024*** 0.0068*** -0.0038***
[0.0004] [0.001] [0.0008] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0006] [0.0009] [0.0006]
IT 0.021*** -0.065*** -0.014*** 0.051*** -0.12*** 0.086*** -0.0096*** -0.017*** 0.070***
[0.002] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004]
CT 0.011* 0.027 0.062*** 0.038*** 0.0047 -0.12*** 0.044*** -0.016 -0.055***
[0.006] [0.02] [0.010] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.008] [0.01] [0.009]
Obs 7053
R2 0.084 0.413 0.552 0.530 0.415 0.583 0.460 0.566 0.437
Own-wage elasticity -0.797 -0.950 -0.391 0.0489 0.0106 -0.721 -1.338 -0.670 -0.642
Hansen J statistic 3624.6
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets. Country-industry and year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations
are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of
the variables, see Table C13.
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Table C9: IT, CT and worker types by skill and by age (trade openness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln WHS 0.11*** -0.051*** -0.062***
[0.007] [0.010] [0.009]
ln WMS -0.15*** 0.011 0.14***
[0.008] [0.01] [0.01]
ln WLS 0.035*** 0.040*** -0.075***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
ln W29 0.059*** -0.076*** 0.017***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.006]
ln W49 0.012 0.14*** -0.15***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.007]
ln W50 -0.070*** -0.066*** 0.14***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
ln Y -0.0063* -0.032*** 0.039*** 0.011*** -0.027*** 0.016***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
K -0.00080 0.0061*** -0.0053** 0.0046*** -0.0049*** 0.00030
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
IT 0.052*** -0.18*** 0.13*** -0.068*** 0.034*** 0.034***
[0.008] [0.01] [0.01] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
CT 0.082*** 0.065** -0.15*** 0.11*** -0.056*** -0.051***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
E GDP -0.0060 -0.050 0.056 -0.11*** -0.55*** 0.67***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
I GDP -0.18*** 0.36*** -0.18*** 0.066 1.27*** -1.33***
[0.05] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04]
Obs 7053 7053
R2 0.583 0.274 0.659 0.595 0.297 0.506
Own-wage elasticity -0.200 -0.400 -1.084 -0.515 -0.181 -0.122
Hansen J statistic 718.7 600.3
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns (1)–(3)
and columns (4)–(6). Country-industry and year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations are weighted by the
share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5%
(**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table C10: IT, CT and worker types by age-skill (trade openness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln W29,HS 0.0038* -0.020*** 0.027*** 0.0021 -0.037*** -0.024*** 0.043*** -0.022*** 0.027***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
ln W29,MS 0.014*** -0.016* 0.0019 0.072*** -0.082*** 0.024*** -0.042*** 0.016** 0.012***
[0.003] [0.009] [0.005] [0.008] [0.01] [0.009] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
ln W29,LS -0.0088*** 0.023*** 0.032*** -0.018*** -0.0025 0.022*** -0.0039* -0.034*** -0.0094***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
ln W49,HS 0.014*** 0.012 -0.022*** 0.11*** -0.073*** -0.026*** -0.0036 0.010 -0.020***
[0.003] [0.009] [0.005] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005]
ln W49,MS -0.032*** 0.033*** 0.027*** -0.19*** 0.26*** 0.019* -0.047*** -0.069*** 0.0042
[0.004] [0.01] [0.006] [0.009] [0.01] [0.01] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005]
ln W49,LS 0.0071*** -0.046*** -0.037*** -0.0030 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.028*** -0.020***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.003] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
ln W50,HS 0.00063 -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.0017 0.070*** -0.016*** -0.0050* 0.00077 -0.017***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
ln W50,MS 0.0043 -0.061*** 0.0059 0.030*** -0.15*** 0.088*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.0045
[0.003] [0.009] [0.005] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
ln W50,LS -0.0037 0.094*** -0.021*** 0.0011 -0.0031 -0.12*** 0.0025 0.030*** 0.020***
[0.002] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
ln Y -0.0057*** -0.019*** 0.035*** -0.0037 -0.025*** -0.00062 0.0018 0.0095*** 0.0072***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
K -0.0029*** -0.0026* 0.0092*** 0.0025** 0.00084 -0.010*** 0.0017** 0.0053*** -0.0037***
[0.0005] [0.001] [0.0008] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.0007] [0.0010] [0.0007]
IT 0.022*** -0.063*** -0.018*** 0.055*** -0.11*** 0.091*** -0.015*** -0.024*** 0.066***
[0.002] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
CT 0.012** 0.037** 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.011 -0.12*** 0.038*** -0.021* -0.061***
[0.006] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.008] [0.01] [0.008]
E GDP -0.066*** -0.14*** 0.13*** -0.039* -0.27*** -0.16*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.15***
[0.009] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
I GDP 0.056*** 0.12** -0.14*** 0.038 0.79*** 0.24*** -0.39*** -0.48*** -0.24***
[0.02] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.06] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03]
Obs 7053
R2 0.087 0.416 0.552 0.530 0.464 0.585 0.467 0.596 0.449
Own-wage elasticity -0.845 -0.956 -0.299 0.0458 0.0973 -0.621 -1.097 -0.488 -0.644
Hansen J statistic 3792.2
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets. Country-industry and year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations
are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of
the variables, see Table C13.
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Table C11: IT, CT and worker types by skill and by age (labour market programmes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Wsh HS MS LS 15–29 30–49 50+
ln WHS 0.093*** -0.084*** -0.0095
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
ln WMS -0.10*** 0.039*** 0.064***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.010]
ln WLS 0.010*** 0.045*** -0.055***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
ln W29 0.057*** -0.050*** -0.0073
[0.006] [0.008] [0.007]
ln W49 -0.028*** 0.12*** -0.095***
[0.008] [0.01] [0.009]
ln W50 -0.030*** -0.073*** 0.10***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.006]
ln Y 0.0014 -0.036*** 0.034*** 0.012*** -0.00070 -0.012***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
K 0.0016 0.00018 -0.0018 0.0031*** 0.0011 -0.0042***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0010] [0.001] [0.001]
IT 0.040*** -0.19*** 0.15*** -0.059*** -0.043*** 0.10***
[0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
CT 0.031** 0.13*** -0.16*** 0.094*** -0.10*** 0.0063
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
LMP 1 -1.79*** 3.84*** -2.04*** 1.41*** 0.28 -1.69***
[0.3] [0.4] [0.4] [0.3] [0.4] [0.3]
LMP 2 0.65*** -1.88*** 1.23*** -0.60*** -0.11 0.71***
[0.10] [0.1] [0.1] [0.09] [0.1] [0.09]
Obs 5689 5689
R2 0.573 0.316 0.652 0.643 0.209 0.462
Own-wage elasticity -0.310 -0.351 -0.997 -0.520 -0.215 -0.291
Hansen J statistic 1498.0 933.5
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets in columns (1)–(3)
and columns (4)–(6). Country-industry and year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations are weighted by the
share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5%
(**), and 10% (*). For the description of the variables, see Table C13.
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Table C12: IT, CT and worker types by age-skill (labour market programmes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Wsh (15–29,HS) (15–29,MS) (15–29,LS) (30–49,HS) (30–49,MS) (30–49,LS) (50+,HS) (50+,MS) (50+,LS)
ln W29,HS 0.013*** 0.0025 0.028*** 0.0038 -0.027*** -0.017** 0.026*** -0.031*** 0.0028
[0.003] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
ln W29,MS 0.013*** -0.024*** -0.014*** 0.061*** -0.093*** -0.0084 -0.023*** 0.060*** 0.028***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.007] [0.010] [0.008] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
ln W29,LS -0.0073*** 0.024*** 0.020*** -0.014*** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.015*** -0.051*** -0.021***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
ln W49,HS 0.017*** -0.016* -0.025*** 0.11*** -0.12*** 0.039*** 0.0027 -0.015** -0.000039
[0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.01] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005]
ln W49,MS -0.052*** 0.030*** 0.035*** -0.19*** 0.25*** -0.0057 -0.034*** -0.065*** 0.026***
[0.004] [0.01] [0.006] [0.009] [0.01] [0.01] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
ln W49,LS -0.0020 -0.047*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.014** 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.037*** -0.0047
[0.002] [0.006] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
ln W50,HS -0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0013 -0.0061 0.087*** -0.025*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.029***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
ln W50,MS 0.012*** -0.042*** -0.0027 0.036*** -0.12*** 0.062*** 0.030*** 0.050*** -0.024***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.007] [0.01] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005]
ln W50,LS 0.0070*** 0.074*** -0.028*** 0.0089 0.0025 -0.11*** 0.0021 0.026*** 0.022***
[0.003] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
ln Y 0.0010 -0.0053** 0.016*** 0.0033* -0.019*** 0.012*** -0.0050*** -0.0060*** 0.0029**
[0.0008] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
K -0.0025*** -0.0018** 0.0064*** 0.0032*** -0.0023** -0.0030*** 0.0022*** 0.00028 -0.0025***
[0.0003] [0.0009] [0.0005] [0.0008] [0.001] [0.0010] [0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0005]
IT 0.012*** -0.063*** -0.0023 0.036*** -0.13*** 0.061*** 0.0044 0.0046 0.080***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
CT -0.0037 0.035*** 0.046*** -0.0015 0.019 -0.13*** 0.049*** 0.025*** -0.041***
[0.005] [0.01] [0.008] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
LMP 1 0.71*** 0.42 0.019 0.056 0.27 0.53* -1.28*** 0.67*** -1.39***
[0.1] [0.3] [0.2] [0.3] [0.4] [0.3] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
LMP 2 -0.15*** -0.66*** 0.20*** 0.33*** -0.58*** 0.25*** 0.56*** -0.40*** 0.44***
[0.03] [0.09] [0.05] [0.08] [0.1] [0.09] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05]
Obs 5689
R2 0.072 0.481 0.535 0.508 0.340 0.538 0.507 0.599 0.364
Own-wage elasticity -0.529 -1.015 -0.532 0.0967 0.0858 -0.571 -1.296 -0.387 -0.613
Hansen J statistic 5111.8
Instruments First and second lags of instrumented variables
Notes: Iterated Three-Stages Least Squares (I3SLS) with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets. Country-industry and year fixed effects included in all equations. All equations
are weighted by the share of each industry’s employment in country-wide employment in 1982. Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). For the description of
the variables, see Table C13.
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Table C13: Description of variables
Variable Description Source
WshHS Wage bill share of high-skilled workers EU KLEMS
WshMS Wage bill share of medium-skilled workers EU KLEMS
WshLS Wage bill share of low-skilled workers EU KLEMS
Wsh15−29 Wage bill share of workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
Wsh30−49 Wage bill share of workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
Wsh50+ Wage bill share of workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
Wsh15−29,HS Wage bill share of high-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
Wsh15−29,MS Wage bill share of medium-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
Wsh15−29,LS Wage bill share of low-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
Wsh30−49,HS Wage bill share of high-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
Wsh30−49,MS Wage bill share of medium-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
Wsh30−49,LS Wage bill share of low-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
Wsh50+,HS Wage bill share of high-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
Wsh50+,MS Wage bill share of medium-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
Wsh50+,LS Wage bill share of low-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
EshHS Employment share of high-skilled workers EU KLEMS
EshMS Employment share of medium-skilled workers EU KLEMS
EshLS Employment share of low-skilled workers EU KLEMS
Esh15−29 Employment share of workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
Esh30−49 Employment share of workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
Esh50+ Employment share of workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
Esh15−29,HS Employment share of high-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
Esh15−29,MS Employment share of medium-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
Esh15−29,LS Employment share of low-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
Esh30−49,HS Employment share of high-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
Esh30−49,MS Employment share of medium-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
Esh30−49,LS Employment share of low-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
Esh50+,HS Employment share of high-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
Esh50+,MS Employment share of medium-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
Esh50+,LS Employment share of low-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
EHS Hours worked by high-skilled workers EU KLEMS
EMS Hours worked by medium-skilled workers EU KLEMS
ELS Hours worked by low-skilled workers EU KLEMS
E15−29 Hours worked by workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
E30−49 Hours worked by workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
E50+ Hours worked by workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
E15−29,HS Hours worked by high-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
E15−29,MS Hours worked by medium-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
E15−29,LS Hours worked by low-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
E30−49,HS Hours worked by high-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
E30−49,MS Hours worked by medium-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
E30−49,LS Hours worked by low-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
E50+,HS Hours worked by high-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
E50+,MS Hours worked by medium-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
E50+,LS Hours worked by low-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
WHS Relative real hourly wage of high-skilled workers EU KLEMS
WMS Relative real hourly wage of medium-skilled workers EU KLEMS
WLS Relative real hourly wage of low-skilled workers EU KLEMS
W15−29 Relative real hourly wage of workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
W30−49 Relative real hourly wage of workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
W50+ Relative real hourly wage of workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
W15−29,HS Relative real hourly wage of high-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
W15−29,MS Relative real hourly wage of medium-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
W15−29,LS Relative real hourly wage of low-skilled workers aged 15–29 EU KLEMS
W30−49,HS Relative real hourly wage of high-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
W30−49,MS Relative real hourly wage of medium-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
W30−49,LS Relative real hourly wage of low-skilled workers aged 30–49 EU KLEMS
W50+,HS Relative real hourly wage of high-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
W50+,MS Relative real hourly wage of medium-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
W50+,LS Relative real hourly wage of low-skilled workers aged 50+ EU KLEMS
Y Real gross value added EU KLEMS
K Ratio of real non-ICT capital stock to real gross value added EU KLEMS
IT Ratio of real IT capital stock to real gross value added EU KLEMS
CT Ratio of real CT capital stock to real gross value added EU KLEMS
IT Y Ratio of real IT capital stock to real gross output EU KLEMS
CT Y Ratio of real CT capital stock to real gross output EU KLEMS
IT H1 Ratio of real IT capital stock to total hours worked by persons engaged EU KLEMS
CT H1 Ratio of real CT capital stock to total hours worked by persons engaged EU KLEMS
IT H2 Ratio of real IT capital stock to total hours worked by employees EU KLEMS
CT H2 Ratio of real CT capital stock to total hours worked by employees EU KLEMS
IT2 Ratio of real gross fixed IT capital formation to real gross value added EU KLEMS
CT2 Ratio of real gross fixed CT capital formation to real gross value added EU KLEMS
UD Ratio of union members to the total number of employees OECD
LPROD Ratio of value added to total hours worked EU KLEMS
E GDP Ratio of value of country-level exports to GDP WB WDI
I GDP Ratio of value of country-level imports to GDP WB WDI
LMP 1 Ratio of government expenditures on active labour market programmes to GDP OECD
LMP 2 Ratio of government expenditures on passive labour market programmes to GDP OECD
Notes: Author’s notation.
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